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Summary 
Introduction 
This report explores the design of Talent Match and locates the programme in the context of 
wider employment policy and programmes. In doing so it compares the design of Talent Match 
to the Work Programme, the most prominent, publicly funded and contemporary source of 
unemployment services to young people. 
The report aims to: 
• provide the labour market context for Talent Match; 
• explore the paradigms that underpin Talent Match; 
• compare the commissioning process for Talent Match and the Work Programme at the 
direct contracting level;  
• compare subcontracting arrangements;  
• compare the design and delivery arrangements of the service provision on each 
programme. 
Labour market and policy context 
Young people were disproportionately affected by the 2008 recession and those facing the 
most disadvantage have been most impacted by ongoing labour market changes. In response, 
The National Lottery Community Fund (hereafter the Fund) established Talent Match  in 2012 
to support young people who were furthest from the labour market through personalised, non-
standardised provision. Talent Match was designed and conceived during a period of peak 
unemployment for young people, although rates fell over the course of the programme’s 
operation. It was also initially designed to address concern over young people were not in 
receipt of benefits, and ‘hidden’ from the official employment and skills system.  
Over the last forty years a range of mainstream national programmes have sought to support 
young people into work. At the time that Talent Match was implemented, the Work Programme 
was the mainstream publicly funded programme (covering all working age groups).  
Comparative models: a strategic perspective  
Employment programmes often fall into one of two different models. Work First programmes 
prioritise entry to work at the earliest opportunity. The main emphasis of this approach is on 
job search assistance, short-term work preparation activity, targeted short-term work 
experience and support to help with barriers to work such as transport, clothes and tools for 
jobs. Human Capital approaches, in contrast, seek to increase skills and qualif ications to 
reduce the disadvantages that individuals face before assisting them to find work.  The Work 
Programme was predominantly a Work First programme. While Talent Match contained many 
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Work First elements, it also incorporated some elements of a more human capital-based 
approach.  
Key principles of Talent Match included:  
• partnership and coordination at the local level; 
• localised solutions; 
• youth involvement and co-design; 
• voluntary sector leadership; 
• a test and learn approach to delivery; 
• voluntary participation. 
Programme design at the direct contract level 
The Work Programme was a much larger programme than Talent Match, geographically and 
in terms of total spending, although Talent Match was still large for a voluntary sector led, 
grant funded programme. In terms of the resources per participant, however, resources were 
much tighter on the Work Programme, partly due to its payment by results funding model. 
Whereas the Work Programme was a national, universal programme, Talent Match was much 
more geographically targeted, although this relaxed over the course of the programme.  
There was considerable diversity in the size and background of Talent Match lead partners 
and Work Programme ‘prime providers’ (or ‘primes’). Reflecting the size of the contracts, 
primes were generally larger and were mainly from the private sector. Talent Match lead 
partners were all from the voluntary sector, though some were social enterprises rather than 
charities.  
While the Work Programme incorporated several elements of market competition, Talent 
Match was more partnership based. The Work Programme was also more tightly performance 
managed, with minimum performance targets for some groups of participants. In terms of 
monitoring, both programmes focussed primarily on job outcomes, though Talent Match 
recorded more information on soft outcomes and the Work Programme had a stronger 
emphasis on sustained employment.  
Programme design at the subcontracting level 
Both programmes operated subcontracting models and the degree of subcontracting varied 
between different contracts or partnerships. There was also great variation on both 
programmes in the size and background of subcontractors. The main point of distinction was 
that whilst on the Work Programme, there were similar proportions of voluntary and private 
sector end-to-end subcontractors, on Talent Match, most delivery partners were from the 
voluntary sector.  
Work Programme prime providers followed a range of different approaches to subcontracting, 
while Talent Match was more consistently based around partnerships. A variety of payment 
models for subcontracting were seen on both programmes, but payment by results was more 
likely to be passed onto subcontractors on the Work Programme. Relationships between direct 
contractors and subcontractors varied, but generally there was a much higher scope for 
performance management on the Work Programme than on Talent Match. Overall, relations 
between direct contractors and subcontractors on both programmes appear to have been 
largely positive based on provider survey responses. 
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Service design 
Eligibility for the Work Programme was based on the length of time spent on certain benefits. 
Talent Match initially focussed on young people not in work, training, education or on benefits, 
but as the programme progressed, being out of work became the main eligibility criteria.  
Whereas Work Programme participation was compulsory and relied on referrals from the Job 
Centre Plus, Talent Match partners had to recruit young people. They did so primarily via peer-
to-peer methods or referrals from other organisations, including the Job Centre Plus in some 
cases. Participants on both programmes were more likely to be male, white, non-disabled and 
to live in deprived areas. Although comparisons are diff icult, it appears that Talent Match 
participants were more likely to have faced significant adverse life events.  
Both programmes offered a core of work-first based interventions. For at least some 
participants, however, Talent Match also offered a second tier of more intensive interventions. 
Both programmes also offered in-work support and engaged with employers to at least some 
degree. Both programmes exhibited very high levels of flexibility for providers to design their 
own services, though Work Programme providers were more beholden to pledges made at 
the bidding stage. Talent Match partnerships were more likely to exhibit examples of 
innovation and adapted as part of a ‘test and learn’ approach. The role of young people in 
design and delivery stands out as perhaps the main innovation of Talent Match. Provision on 
the Work Programme sought to balance the cost of provision against the likelihood of outcome 
payments under payment by results. Talent Match providers did not experience this financial 
pressure and were freer to be flexible in the levels support offered to any young person.  
Conclusions 
Whereas the Work Programme embodied the principles of the market and public sector 
contracting, notably payment by results, Talent Match arguably adopted a more network, 
partnership-based approach. There were clear differences in terms of the ethos, contract 
design and services. Perhaps less obviously, however, there were also several similarities in 
terms of each programme’s core offering. Neither can be caricatured as the embodiment of 
either grant based, voluntary sector provision or of public sector outsourcing to monolithic 
private sector contractors. This report therefore highlights that whilst in some ways Talent 
Match mirrored existing provision, in others it was a genuinely innovative and distinctive form 
of provision for young unemployed people.  
Lessons for policy 
Programme design is vitally important to the eventual character of a programme. If certain 
programme characteristics are desired, such as innovation over the course of delivery, 
targeting the hardest to help, or balancing job outcomes against ‘softer’ outcomes, then these 
need to be explicitly reflected in the programme design.  
Although already distinctive, Talent Match could, if desired, have been differentiated even 
further from the Work Programme in a number of ways. For example, it could have focussed 
more on job subsidisation, weakened the focus on job outcomes, or scaled back work-first 
provision and increased the amount of intensive intervention. These would not necessarily 
have led to a ‘better’ programme, but it is important to highlight that these are important design 
decisions for this and future programmes.  
Finally, it should be borne in mind that many of the design features discussed in this report 
have cost implications. Talent Match partnerships were able to spend a much higher average 
amount per participant than the Work Programme and it is this investment, above all else, 
which allowed innovation in its delivery and design. 
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 1 1. Introduction 
1.1. About Talent Match 
The National Lottery Community Fund (the Fund) (then the Big Lottery Fund) invested 
£108 million in Talent Match, a programme designed to address unemployment 
amongst 18-24-year olds. It was delivered using National Lottery funding between 
2014 and 2018 through voluntary sector led partnerships in 21 Local Enterprise 
Partnership areas in England. The programme sought to support young people who 
are furthest from the labour market through personalised provision which addressed 
their needs and aspirations.  
1.2. Aims and purpose of the report 
This report situates Talent Match in the wider context of youth unemployment and 
related service provision in England. It also explores in depth the way Talent Match 
was designed, compared against the main form of public sector provision over the 
same period, the Work Programme. The purpose of this comparison is to highlight the 
ways in which Talent Match succeeded in providing a relatively distinctive offering to 
young unemployed people. Talent Match aimed to build upon, not replicate, existing 
provision. It sought to offer a different type of employment support to the compulsory, 
work-first focussed provision offered under the Work Programme. This report therefore 
helps to assess whether Talent Match lived up to its foundational principles of being 
partnership based, voluntary sector led, locally designed, voluntary (non-compulsory), 
involving young people in its design and delivery, and based on a test and learn 
approach.  
By exploring in-depth, therefore, where the programmes contrast in their design and 
operation, it is intended that the design of both becomes clearer than in isolation. 
Although outcomes and value for money are outside the scope of this report (see 
instead Wilson et al. 2019), it is clearly necessary to understand the context and design 
features of Talent Match in order to judge its performance on its own terms, in 
accordance with its underlying principles and ethos.   
The report also acts as a published, comprehensive and detailed account of the design 
of Talent Match for future reference, which will prove useful for future funders or 
providers aiming to establish new youth unemployment programmes. It highlights the 
myriad design choices which form the design of an employment programme. Many of 
these choices lie on a spectrum, for example between private sector or voluntary 
sector provision, work-first or human capital-based approaches, partnership or 
hierarchical based contracting. Talent Match and the Work Programme lie at different 
points on these various spectra and comparing their design should help those involved 
in the design of future service provision to understand the choices available to them. 
In particular, those seeking to design a distinctive ‘voluntary sector’ programme may 
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wish to use the information contained as either a model, or even as a benchmark 
against which to design an even greater contrast to mainstream programmes such as 
the Work Programme.   
1.3. Scope of the report 
This report explores the design of Talent Match in-depth and locates the programme 
in the context of wider employment policy and programmes. A wide-ranging literature 
review was undertaken as part of this research to identify the many programme 
features and decisions which, taken together, make up the design of an employment 
service. The literature suggested four broad aspects for comparison: values and ethos, 
commissioning design (at both the ‘prime’ and subcontracting levels), service design, 
and outcomes. This report focuses primarily on the first three of these aspects.  
Issues related to measuring outcomes, cost-benefits and value for money can be 
complex (Greenberg et al., 2011). Headline comparisons of outcomes between Talent 
Match and other employment services are challenging and potentially invidious due to 
the very large number of confounding differences relating to their design and context. 
In addition, there are often differences in the way that outcomes are measured. The 
outcomes, additionality and impact achieved by Talent Match are explored in a 
companion report which tackles these issues explicitly and in-depth (Wilson et al., 
2019).  
Chapter 2 provides the labour market context for Talent Match, including trends in 
youth unemployment and the programmes designed to tackle it. Chapter 3 explores 
the paradigms that underlie Talent Match, relating to its rationale, ethos and objectives. 
The remaining chapters are more technical and hone-in on the Work Programme as a 
comparative case study for Talent Match. Chapter 4 examines the design of the 
commissioning process for both programmes at the direct contracting level (prime 
providers and partnership leads). Chapter 5 explores subcontracting arrangements 
(end-to-end subcontractors and delivery partners). Finally, chapter 6 explores the 
design and delivery arrangements of the service provision on each programme.    
The Work Programme was the dominant form of public sector provision over the 
lifespan of Talent Match and primarily operated with different underlying assumptions 
and principles. As such, it provides a natural point of comparison. Considerable 
evidence is also available on the design and operation of the Work Programme via its 
official evaluation. Exploring how the two programmes differ, or are alike, in their aims, 
organisation and context, is intended to make explicit the many implicit and explicit 
aspects of their design. This in turn should allow a more informed consideration of 
whether each programme has been successful on its own terms and within the 
constraints and opportunities it faced.  
1.4. Data 
This report draws on a range of data sources from the Talent Match evaluation, which 
are described in-depth in a companion report (CRESR, 2019). In particular, the report 
uses longitudinal surveys of Talent Match participants, partnership leads and delivery 
partners.   
For data on the Work Programme, this report draws largely on the official evaluation 
reports published by the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) (Newton et al., 
2012; Lane et al., 2013; Meager et al., 2014; Foster et al., 2014). In some cases, 
further analysis or evidence is also drawn from the wider literature and policy debate 
on the Work Programme.  
 3 
As part of the official evaluation (Foster et al., 2014), Work Programme subcontractors 
were surveyed online in 2012, 2013 and 2014. At each of these waves of research, 
qualitative research was also undertaken with prime providers, subcontractors, DWP 
and JCP staff. Work Programme participants were also surveyed by phone to explore 
their experiences in 2012 and 2014. Further details of the methodologies used can be 
found in the relevant evaluation reports.  
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 2 2. The labour market context 
for Talent Match 
This chapter sets out the labour market rationale for the Talent Match programme 
given trends in youth unemployment. Looking beyond official administrative and 
survey statistics it examines growing concerns about young people who are not 
counted in the statistics and so who are ‘hidden’ from the official public gaze. It gives 
a brief historical overview of programmes to address unemployment, with a particular 
focus on more recent years. It outlines key features of labour market change and 
changing youth transitions. This sets the context for the labour market case for Talent 
Match. Of course, Talent Match was not the only programme focusing on young people 
at this time; rather it operated alongside mandatory national active labour market 
programmes and a range of voluntary initiatives operating at the local level.  
2.1. Youth unemployment 
Trends in youth unemployment 
Figure 2.1 shows trends in the ILO unemployment rate1 from 1971 to 2018 for those 
aged 16-64 years and from 1992 to 2018 for young people aged 18-24 years. Over 
the period from 1992 when data for young people are available it is clear that the ILO 
unemployment rate for 18-24 year olds remained considerably higher than for those 
aged 16-64 years. The increase in the ILO unemployment rate in the ‘Great Recession’ 
was much more marked for young people than for all adults. The ILO unemployment 
rate for 18-24 year olds rose from slightly over 10 per cent between 2000 and 2004 to 
12.2 per cent in 2006 and 2007 and 17.3 per cent in 2009, peaking at 19.3 per cent in 
2012 before declining to 13.2 per cent in 2015 and 10.2 per cent in 2018. The rise in 
youth unemployment at the time Talent Match was conceived and designed also 
spawned the introduction of other initiatives (nationally and locally) seeking to help 
young people into employment. By the time that Talent Match (and other local 
initiatives) was implemented, youth unemployment was relatively high but declining. 
This had the potential to lead to confusion and tensions when different organisations 
were seeking to help the same beneficiaries. 
Figure 2.2 shows trends in the Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) claimant count for 18-24 
year olds in the UK over the period from 1996 to 2017 distinguishing between those 
claiming for more than and less than 6 months. The number of JSA claimants in this 
age group peaked in 2009 and 2011 at around 460 thousand. Hence the claimant 
count declined markedly during the period when Talent Match was implemented.  
 
1 The ILO unemployment rate covers those who are out of work and want a job, have actively sought work in the 
last four weeks and are available to start work in the next two weeks; plus those who are out of work, have found 
a job and are waiting to start in  the next two weeks. 
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Figure 2.1: ILO unemployment rate in the UK, 1971-2018 
 
Source: Labour Force Survey (via Nomis) 
Figure 2.2: JSA claims in the UK, 1996-2017 
 
 Source: JSA claims (via Nomis) 
These trends at national level mask spatial variations in unemployment and the 
claimant count at a local level. At sub-national level sampling variation in the Labour 
Force Survey means that small changes in statistics reported for young people need 
to be interpreted with caution, while with regard to administrative statistics latterly the 
phased roll-out of Universal Credit (UC) has implications for the interpretation of 
claimant count data at local level. (JSA and UC are discussed in more detail 
subsequently.)  
Who is counted? 
The statistics presented above show a significant fall in youth unemployment over the 
medium-term. Talent Match was implemented during a period of considerable welfare 
reform. Concerns have been expressed that changes in the benefits system, including 
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increasing use of mandatory requirements and conditionality, including the use of 
benefit sanctions, may have led young people who would otherwise claim benefits not 
to do so. In written evidence presented in September 2016 to the House of Commons 
Work and Pensions Committee’s Enquiry on ‘Employment Opportunities for Young 
People’ (WPC, 2017) the Learning and Work Institute estimated that data show that: 
“the proportion of unemployed young people (not counting students) who are not 
claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance and therefore are not receiving official help with job 
search is now 59.7 per cent and has risen by more than thirty percentage points since 
October 2012.”  
In their subsequent 2017 report the House of Commons Work and Pensions 
Committee (WPC, 2017) noted that they had received evidence that some young 
people perceive the benefits of using Jobcentre Plus as insufficient to justify the 
demands that the service places upon them and that some young people found 
attending Jobcentre Plus intimidating and stressful. Several witnesses emphasised 
that young people with greater barriers to work needed a more tailored, personalised 
approach. Some Talent Match beneficiaries expressed similar sentiments. 
Overall, this suggests that there a sizeable proportion of young people who are out of 
work and ‘hidden’ from the official gaze of the benefits, employment and skills system. 
According to the Impetus-PEF Youth Jobs Index (2017), one in four 16-24 year olds 
spend some time Not in Education, Employment or Training (NEET), with over 800 
thousand spending a year or more in NEET. This suggests that despite what 
conventional statistics suggest, a structural, as opposed to cyclical, youth 
unemployment problem remains. This group may include some who were able to 
subsist with other support (from their family for example) or who have secured income 
in the informal economy. However, for individuals outside the labour market for longer 
periods, there is well established evidence around the longer-term effects in terms of 
wage scarring, but also physical and mental health (ACEVO, 2015; McQuaid, 2015).  
Research using the Longitudinal Education Outcomes (LEO) dataset (Gadsby, 2019) 
shows that disadvantaged young people are twice as likely to be NEET as their better-
off peers and that this gap has remained consistent over the period from 2010 to 2017. 
The gap is even larger in the North East and in Yorkshire & the Humber and smaller 
in London - suggesting that local labour demand may play an important role in spatial 
variations in young people’s experience. At a national level, half of the gap between 
disadvantaged young people and their better off peers can be explained by differences 
in qualif ication levels, suggesting that additional support needs – such as mental 
health support and housing advice – need to be addressed too, as education and 
training alone cannot bridge the gap. 
2.2. Programmes to address youth unemployment 
Over the last 40 years there has been a range of programmes and initiatives from 
successive Governments, of different political persuasions, aimed at addressing youth 
unemployment. Key features of the main programmes are outlined below, albeit it 
should be borne in mind that these are not the only interventions and benefit changes 
that impacted on young people over this period. 
In 1978 the Youth Opportunities Programme (YOP) provided 12 months’ work 
experience and training for school leavers aged 16-18 years. Replacing YOP the 
Youth Training Scheme (YTS), introduced in 1983, combined training and work 
experience for 16-17 year olds. In 1998 YTS effectively became the only way for the 
young unemployed to secure out-of-work income given the removal of young people 
aged under 18 years from Unemployment Benefit. YTS was rebranded as Youth 
Training in 1990. During the 1980s conditionality intensified as job seekers were 
required to attend Jobcentres more frequently and demonstrate they were actively 
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looking for work, while lower benefit payments were introduced for claimants aged 
under 25 years without children. Job Seeker’s Allowance (JSA), a new benefit 
merging Unemployment Benefit and Income Support, was introduced in 1996. There 
were benefit sanctions for failing to look for work, leaving jobs without due reason or  
for misconduct and refusing to attend courses or not complying with directions from 
the Jobcentre. Hence from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s the emphasis of youth 
employability programmes was on work experience and training, in the context of 
increases in conditionality. 
In 1998 the New Labour Government introduced the New Deal for Young People 
(NDYP) for young people aged 18-24 years in receipt of JSA for six months. NDYP 
involved a ‘Gateway’ period of intensive job search followed by participation in one of 
four options: a subsidised job, a place on the Environment Task Force, a placement 
with a voluntary sector employer, or full-time education or training. Referral was 
mandatory and those eligible young people who failed to comply were subject to 
sanctions. NDYP was part of a broader suite of ‘New Deal’ programmes focusing on 
different labour market sub-groups, such as lone parents and disabled people. 
In the face of rising youth unemployment in 2009 the Future Jobs Fund (FJF) was 
introduced for young people aged 18-24 years who had been in receipt of JSA for at 
least six months. The FJF created subsidised jobs in the public or third sector. In 2010 
the FJF became part of the Young Person’s Guarantee (YPG) which offered all 18-
24 year olds who had been in receipt of JSA for six months a job, training or work 
experience. 
From 2011 the Work Programme was the mainstream employment programme for 
long-term unemployed. JSA claimants aged 18-24 were referred to the Work 
Programme after nine months unless they faced significant disadvantage. It was a 
mandatory programme offering a range of back-to-work support delivered by a range 
of organisations spanning the private and third sector. Utilising a ‘black box’ approach 
providers had flexibility to tailor support to meet individual and local area needs. 
Referrals to the Work Programme ended in March 2017 but it continued to support 
participants until early 2019.  
The Work Programme was replaced by the smaller (in scale and scope) Work and 
Health Programme (WHP), providing specialist support for those who are likely to be 
able to find work within 12 months. In practice many young people previously 
supported by the Work Programme received support from the Jobcentre rather than 
the WHP. 
In 2012 the Government launched the Youth Contract which was a package of 
schemes aimed at helping young people into sustained employment. It combined 
existing and new schemes and included an offer of work experience or a place on a 
sector-based work academy (involving a mixture of training, work experience and a 
job interview) for unemployed JSA claimants aged 18-24 years; extra Personal Adviser 
time at the Jobcentre and a careers interview in the first three months of a claim. For 
employers it included an Apprenticeship Grant for employers of 16-24 year olds and 
also wage incentives to engage unemployed young people. Although the Youth 
Contract was a national scheme some local areas - Leeds City Region, Liverpool and 
Newcastle – received central funding to devise their own localised Youth Contracts. 
Over time more young people have been affected by Revised Lone Parent 
Obligations which have successively reduced the age of the youngest child at which 
lone parents must actively seek work. This highlights how certain groups of young 
people – in this instance lone parents – are impacted not only by changes in youth 
employment programmes but also by changes in the benefits regime affecting other 
labour market sub-groups of which they might form part. 
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From 2013 Universal Credit (UC) was rolled out in phases across the UK replacing 
six existing payments for working age people: Income Support, Income-Based JSA, 
Income-Related Employment Support Allowance, Housing Benefit, Child Tax Credit 
and Working Tax Credit). The standard allowances within UC are lower for the under 
25s than for those aged 25 years and over. Under UC individual ‘Claimant 
Commitments’ increase job seeking expectations for most claimants and the default 
requirement is that claimants treat job-seeking as a full-time job. Importantly, UC 
claimants on low incomes were subject to conditionality for the first time to increase 
their earnings. 
The introduction of the Youth Obligation (YO) in UC full service areas from 2017 
placed an effective (mandatory) requirement on school leavers and young people 
claiming UC to either ‘earn or learn’. In practice 18-21 years olds making a new claim 
received intensive work focused support from day one of their claim, including 
practising job applications and interviews together with job search. Each individual was 
assigned a work coach. If the claimant was still unemployed and claiming Universal 
Credit after six months they are expected to apply for an apprenticeship, traineeship, 
gain work-based skills or take up a work placement. 
The programmes and benefit changes outlined above are largely national in nature 
and have involved UK Government funding. European funding has been a further 
source of funding, in particular the European Social Fund (ESF) Operational 
Programme, which is part of the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) 
Growth Programme for England in 2014-2020. The Programme’s priorities are to 
increase labour market participation, promote social inclusion and develop the skills of 
the potential and existing workforce. In particular in the context of Talent Match, it 
contributes to improving youth employment by providing support for young people who 
are harder to reach.  
It incorporates Youth Employment Initiative (YEI) money to support youth 
employment in areas with higher rates of youth unemployment. The YEI aims to help 
young people who are not in employment, education or training towards sustainable 
employment, with a particular emphasis on apprenticeships, traineeships, job 
placements and further education leading to a qualif ication. It may be considered as 
complementary to other actions undertaken at national level in this regard.   
The YEI shared several similarities with Talent Match in that it was geographically 
targeted at areas of highest need, involved the establishment of local steering and 
operational groups to guide activity – often building on existing local partnerships – 
and emphasised bring together different providers to meet the varying needs of NEET 
young people (Some Talent Match partnerships have been in receipt of  YEI funding 
and explicitly worked with the funding streams to expand Talent Match provision) 
(Ecorys, 2017). 
In addition to mainstream UK Government funding there were a range of local 
initiatives of relevance to youth employment funded by local authorities, City Deals, 
Devolution Deals and Employment Support Innovation Pilots, as well as initiatives led 
by major third sector organisations such as the Prince’s Trust, Business in the 
Community and others. A specific example of such an initiative is MyGo, which was 
an integrated employment and skills programme, designed to tackle youth 
unemployment in Suffolk, established as part of the Greater Ipswich City Deal. It aimed 
to provide more effective support for young people to enable them to make informed 
decisions about their future and move towards and into sustainable employment. Key 
elements included co-location of Jobcentre Plus services with additional employment 
support in order to provide a personalised and more intensive support offer, 
collaborative partnership working to facilitate access to a wide range of support options, 
 9 
and an offer of a range of different pathways towards the labour market, tailored to 
young people’s needs and aspirations.  
The evaluation of MyGo (Bennett et al., 2018) highlighted several themes that chime 
with the Talent Match experience, including: the importance of effective partnerships, 
collaborative leadership and good governance at both strategic and operational levels; 
the value of effective joining up of provision across partners; the quality and seamless 
nature of coaching support that many young people indicated was crucial for 
successful outcomes; an in-house employer engagement team to enhance the MyGo 
offer; and the fact that two-fifths of participants were not claiming benefits at the point 
of referral. 
Interviews with national policy stakeholders during the course of the Talent Match 
National Evaluation confirmed a general acceptance of a direction of travel in youth 
employment policy (and employment support policy more generally) towards localism. 
They highlighted several examples of effective local partnerships which offered clear 
and well-coordinated services to young people. However, there were concerns around 
a ‘proliferation of local initiatives’ leading to a ‘crowded landscape’ and possible 
‘confusion’ or ‘duplication’ of support, whereas national programmes can avoid 
‘postcode lotteries’ and are more clearly designed and delivered than local ones.  
2.3. Changing youth transitions and the labour market case for Talent Match 
Developments in education, training, apprenticeships and traineeships 
At the time that Talent Match was conceived and in the period when it was operational 
there were several important policy changes relating to education and training. A range 
of policies were designed to encourage young people to continue in education or 
training: The Raising the Participation Age in 2013 requiring young people to continue 
in education or training until their 18 th birthday; From the 2014/15 academic year all 
students starting a new study programme of 150 hours or more, aged 16 to 18 years 
who did not hold a GCSE grade A* to C (new GCSE 9 to 4 or equivalent) qualif ication 
in mathematics and/or in English, were required to be studying these subjects as part 
of their study programme in each academic year. Also highlighting the importance of 
qualif ications, the Adult Education Budget provided free training for 19-23 year olds to 
attain their f irst full qualifications at Level 2 (GCSE or equivalent) or Level 3 (A level or 
equivalent), free training for those aged 19 and over up to and including Level 2, and 
free English and Maths training up to Level 2 for anyone who has not achieved that 
level. 
Over the period that Talent Match has been operational a key thrust of Government 
policy has been to expand apprenticeships and traineeships. Apprenticeships involve 
paid employment and are seen as a means to address the transition to work for young 
people not taking the higher education route. Importantly in terms of attractiveness of 
apprenticeships for young people living independently the apprenticeship wage rate in 
the first year is below the national minimum wage for their age group. Traineeships 
are targeted at young people who have not been employed and who have little work 
experience. They are concerned work preparation and work experience. A young 
person on a traineeship they can receive benefits. 
The changing labour market and implications for young people and Talent Match 
Since the late 1970s there has been a marked sectoral shift in the structure of 
employment from manufacturing to services. The labour market has continued to 
change over the last decade – including in ways that disadvantage young people 
(UKCES, 2012). 
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Typically young people are disproportionately concentrated in sales and elementary 
occupations. These occupations are characterised by low pay and were hard hit in 
recession. By contrast employment growth has been concentrated in higher level non-
manual managerial, professional and associate professional occupations which are 
less likely to be filled by young people. Young people employed in such occupations 
are overwhelmingly graduates. Hence labour market change has resulted in fewer 
opportunities for disadvantaged young people and so their transitions to work are more 
diff icult. 
There has also been a shift in the size structure of businesses in the direction of fewer 
large businesses (with 250 or more employees) and more microbusinesses. Smaller 
businesses are less likely to have formal HR structures and recruitment and selection 
processes than large businesses. They are also more likely to emphasise the 
importance of experience when recruiting and to use informal rather than formal 
recruitment methods. Informal connections tend to be built up over time and through 
experience of work. Hence this change in the structure of businesses disadvantages 
young people. There is evidence that the proportion of young people combining 
learning and earning has declined over the last two decades (Conlan et al., 2014). Yet 
the emphasis placed by employers on experience results in the ‘Catch -22’ situation for 
young people: they find it diff icult to get a job without experience and without a job they 
find it diff icult to get experience. With work experience becoming a more important 
component of employability, there was a clear labour market case for work experience 
to be part of the Talent Match offer. 
There is little chance of gaining opportunities for work experience and improving young 
people’s employment rates without working closely with employers. Consistent 
feedback from employers reported in evidence to the House of Commons Work and 
Pensions Committee enquiry on ‘Employment opportunities for young people’ (WPC, 
2017) has been that Jobcentre Plus requirements for young people to apply for a 
significant number of jobs via Universal Jobmatch has led to large volumes of 
applications from unqualif ied candidates. This was irritating for employers and 
unhelpful for young people. Again, there was a clear labour market case for employer 
engagement, to focus on a good match between employer needs and a young 
person’s skills and attitudes. 
2.4. Conclusion: comparators for Talent Match 
The Fund invested £108 million in Talent Match to address unemployment amongst 
18-24 year olds. It was delivered between 2014 and 2018 through partnerships in 21 
Local Enterprise Partnership areas in England. The programme sought to support 
young people who are furthest from the labour market through personalised, non-
standardised provision which addresses their needs and aspirations.  
The labour market and policy evidence presented in this chapter indicates that young 
people were disproportionately affected by the 2008 recession and those facing the 
most disadvantage have been most impacted by ongoing labour market changes. 
Over the last forty years a range of mainstream national programmes have sought to 
support young people into work. The Work Programme was the mainstream 
programme (covering young people and other age groups) operational at the same 
time as Talent Match and so is an obvious comparator. However, there are important 
differences between Talent Match and the Work Programme (as outlined in Chapter 
2) in terms of ethos and the contrast between a voluntary and a mandatory programme. 
Talent Match was also a vastly smaller programme, geographically and financially.  
In terms of focus on areas of highest unemployment and the most disadvantaged, an 
emphasis on local partnership working and joining up local provision, the YEI shares 
several similarities with Talent Match. However, the fact that some Talent Match 
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partnerships used YEI funding to complement and extend their activities, together with 
the fact that there is less evaluation information available than for the Work Programme, 
makes it a more challenging comparator. Hence in subsequent chapters the Work 
Programme is used as the primary comparator for Talent Match. 
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 3 3. Comparative models: a 
strategic perspective 
This chapter provides an assessment of Talent Match vis-à-vis other programmes from 
a strategic perspective. It considers underlying models for youth employability 
programmes. It then sets out the strategic objectives, rationale and ethos of Talent 
Match – including its voluntary nature and co-design with young people as a central 
principle. It outlines the main features of the governance of the programme and 
introduces the underlying partnership model (which is the subject of further exploration 
in subsequent chapters). 
3.1. Models and paradigms underlying youth employability programmes 
In terms of the broad approach to employability programmes taking an active 
approach to help those out of work to find work there are two models:  
• Work First – prioritising entry to work at the earliest opportunity. The main 
emphasis of this approach is on job search assistance, short-term work 
preparation activity, targeted short-term work experience and support to help with 
barriers to work such as transport, clothes and tools for jobs. 
• Human Capital – seeks to increase skills and qualif ications – including through 
longer-term training leading for acquisition of formal qualif ications – to reduce the 
effects of human capital related disadvantages that individuals face before 
assisting them to find work. 
3.2. The strategic objectives, rationale, ethos and governance of Talent Match 
Objectives and rationale 
As outlined in the previous section, in the context of high levels of youth unemployment 
in the Great Recession, the Talent Match programme sought to support young 
people who were furthest from the labour market through personalised, flexible 
provision addressing their needs and aspirations.  
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The Programme Guide for Talent Match (Big Lottery Fund, 2012) set out the principles 
the programme was to follow to “enable thousands of young people to lead successful 
and fulfilling lives”: 
• Structured opportunities: bringing together the public, private and voluntary and 
community sectors to create effective partnerships and coordination at the local 
level. 
• Supporting local solutions: matching the supply of talented young people to 
local demand for employment and enterprise 
• Asset-based: a belief in people-powered change and the ability of young people 
to improve their own circumstances and life chances with the right support. This 
was the rationale for the engagement and involvement of young people in all 
aspects of Talent Match activities: co-design by, and co-delivery with, young 
people were essential tenets of Talent Match. This belief also underpinned the 
objective of promoting positive images of young people. 
Local partnership working: ethos and governance 
The Programme Guide objectives highlight partnership working as a key feature of 
Talent Match. Talent Match is not unique in this regard, but it is distinctive in terms of 
the explicit nature of the emphasis on partnership working. Mainstream employability 
programmes operational at the same time as Talent Match were characterised by 
market-based operations and payment by results character istic of New Public 
Management. The underlying spirit of Talent Match was embedded in partnership 
working principles. The rationale was that involving otherwise independent bodies / 
organisations / agencies with common objectives via collaborative working – both 
horizontally and vertically - in a relationship characterised by at least some degree of 
trust, could produce more flexible/ innovative policy solutions by bringing together 
complementary expertise, aid joining up across policy domains. 
Talent Match partnerships varied in size and structure but in essence they were inter-
organisational collaborative relationships. They were distinctive in terms of the scale 
and role of the voluntary sector as a lead partner, acting as an accountable body 
for the funding and putting in place effective governance arrangements for the 
programme by convening a wider strategic partnership and commissioning delivery 
partners to deliver Talent Match activities (whether on a grant basis, a payment  by 
results basis or a spot purchase arrangement). The strategic partnership typically 
involved senior officials from local authorities, the LEP, an education/ training provider, 
Jobcentre Plus, the police, local employers and young people. The breadth and  
influence of this strategic partnership marks out Talent Match from mainstream youth 
employability programmes. 
An understanding of the need for local solutions is not exclusive to Talent Match, but 
the emphasis on being responsive to local conditions and to the needs of particular 
sub-groups and individuals in placing primacy on the “matching” and “fit” of young 
people to opportunities available locally arguably is greater than in some other 
programmes; (MyGo – outlined in Chapter 1 – is an exception here). At least in part 
this reflects the central role of young people in Talent Match which is inherent in the 
distinctive asset-based approach, with young people involved in co-designing the 
programme as a core principle.  
This ethos is reflected in the results of a Talent Match partnership survey which 
highlighted the three most significant factors which informed the design of Talent 
Match projects as being young people, partner organisations and local data gathered 
by the partnership (identified by 17, 14 and ten, respectively, out of 20 respondents). 
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In successive surveys of Talent Match partners, partnerships were overwhelmingly 
positive about young people’s involvement is assisting delivery across a range of 
activities from marketing, to local evaluation, engagement and dissemination, to 
membership of core partnership committees and involvement in management and 
commissioning of services. Several interviewees during partnership visits highlighted 
the important contribution made by young people in bringing a different dynamic to 
partnerships. The ‘lived experience’ of young people seeking employment helped 
shape the nature and delivery of Talent Match activities.  
A further distinctive feature of Talent Match is the test and learn ethos. The (active) 
contract management approach meant that the Fund provided critical challenge to 
partnerships at key stages in their lifetime, as did the governing bodies of partnerships 
(including local organisations and young people). The partnership managers were able 
to redirect their focus in accordance with their experience and learning and changes 
and opportunities arising in the external environment. In a partnership survey, 15 out 
of the 21 partnerships indicated that during the course of delivering Talent Match they 
had changed some of the ways in which their services/activities were delivered. 
Voluntary versus mandatory participation 
Importantly, participation in the Talent Match programme was voluntary. This marks 
it out from mandatory active labour market programmes such as the Work Programme 
and the Youth Obligation where participation was mandatory for most participants as 
a condition of benefit receipt. In practice, as outlined in a subsequent section on 
‘Engaging participants’, this meant that participants were recru ited to Talent Match via 
a range of routes. Hence, in strategic terms (within the geographical areas within which 
it operated) the pool of young people who were within scope of Talent Match was 
larger and more diverse than for mandatory programmes. Indeed, a key objective of 
Talent Match was to engage with young people beyond the gaze of official statistics 
and so outside the remit of mandatory programmes. 
The voluntary nature of the programme also meant that participants could leave the 
programme when they chose to do so without fear of sanctions. This meant that the 
young people participating in Talent Match exercised choice in a manner that they 
could not in mandatory programmes. In practice, young people engaging in Talent 
Match who had experience of mandatory programmes tended to be positive about the 
voluntary nature of the programme and about the support that the key workers could 
offer them. 
3.3. Conclusion: strategic assessment of Talent Match in a comparative 
perspective 
While Talent Match was a youth employability programme, in that it sought to support 
young people who were furthest from the labour market and to match supply and 
demand, it was also more than this. It was a holistic programme too, in that it placed 
emphasis on non-employment needs and goals also. The relative attention placed on 
employment- and non-employment needs varied – including by individual and key 
worker. The intention was that Talent Match activities planned to deliver employment 
and non-employment goals should be mutually reinforcing, rather than separate. 
Hence, from a strategic perspective Talent Match may be considered as a ‘Youth 
Employability Plus’ programme. 
Given its ‘Youth Employability Plus’ status, it is perhaps not surprising that Talent 
Match does not fall neatly into either of the ‘Work First’ or ‘Human Capital’ approaches 
to employability programmes. Arguably it was closer to a ‘Work First’ than to a ‘Human 
Capital’ approach, albeit without some of the starker elements of the former, which 
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have been criticised as pushing individuals into low-paid poor quality jobs. The 
relational and individualised ethos of Talent Match meant that key workers worked 
closely with young people to identify courses of action and outcomes that were relevant 
to them. Some individuals wanted, and benefited from, ‘Work First’ CV preparation and 
job search support to enter work. For some individuals an initial job might not have 
been the one that they desired, but key workers emphasised that such a role could 
form a ‘stepping stone’ to a preferred job/ career. Other young people used Talent 
Match support to sort out their lives and clarify their options and then worked towards 
longer-term training and education courses, but these were in a minority.  
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 4 4. Programme design at the 
direct contract level 
This chapter compares the commissioning process and overall programme design for 
both Talent Match and the Work Programme. It focuses on the level of ‘direct’ contracts 
between the relevant funder and the organisations responsible  for any further 
contracting. In the Work Programme these direct contracts were with the ‘prime 
providers’ or ‘primes’, and in Talent Match the ‘partnership leads’. The first section 
contrasts the fundamentals of the two programmes, including contract size, length and 
geographic coverage. The chapter then explores the commissioning process for both 
primes and partnership leads, as well as the differences between the two sets of 
providers. The payment model and outcome measures of the two programmes are 
then contrasted, which leads to a consideration of the respective resources available 
to providers. Finally, the roles of various forms of performance management and 
accountability measures are considered in both programmes.  
4.1. Programme size and coverage 
The Work Programme was an extremely large, national programme. The National 
Audit Office estimated in 2014 that the final cost from payments to contractors would 
be approximately £2.4 billion by the end of the programme (NAO, 2014). England, 
Wales and Scotland were divided into 18 ‘Contract Package Areas’ (CPAs), each with 
two to three prime providers. These primes were contracted directly by the DWP to 
provide employment services to the long term unemployed. In total the DWP awarded 
a total of 40 contracts to 18 prime contractors. This represented a consolidation of 
provision from several different predecessor schemes into a smaller number of large 
prime contracts. The intention was to reduce the DWP’s transaction costs, allow 
economies of scale, and alongside the ‘payment by results’ payment model discussed 
below, transfer risk away from the DWP (Finn, 2011; Considine et al., 2018). Primes 
did not have to deliver the entire programme on their own, however, and could 
optionally subcontract out parts of their provision. Approximately 500,000 18-24-year 
olds were successfully referred to the programme over its lifetime. Unlike Talent Match 
the Work Programme was not limited to this age group, however, and its total case 
load, including all types of users, was over 1.9 million people.  
Talent Match was a vastly smaller programme, geographically and financially, even 
compared only to just the Work Programme’s provision to 18-24-year olds. The Fund 
provided £108 million, divided amongst 21 partnerships. By the end of December 2018, 
Talent Match had worked with 25,885 young people, based on the number who had 
filled out the compulsory baseline survey at the start of their involvement. Although 
small compared to the Work Programme, in the context of a voluntary sector led 
programme, funded by the Fund, Talent Match can be considered a relatively large-
scale investment. The contrast with the scale of the Work Programme, however, 
should highlight the limits to what Talent Match could reasonably be expected to 
achieve in terms of societal or area level outcomes.  
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4.2. Length of contracts 
Compared to previous national employment programmes, the Work Programme 
contracts were higher in value and ran for a relatively long period, from June 2011 to 
April 2017. The DWP hoped the security of these long contracts would allow providers 
to develop expertise and encourage them to invest in their capacity. On the other hand, 
economic conditions shifted significantly over the course of the programme, which 
meant that some of the initial f inancial and performance assumptions quickly became 
unrealistic (NAO, 2014). Notably, referrals for some groups proved lower than 
expected and decreased as the labour market gradually improved (Foster et al., 2014). 
There was also a shift towards a higher proportion of Employment Support Allowance 
claimants, who typically faced higher barriers to work.  
Talent Match ran over an overlapping timeframe to the Work Programme, from 
January 2014 to the end of December 2018. As such, it was subject to similar 
advantages and disadvantages. The long time period provided an extended period of 
stability for the provider organisations in a period of ongoing public sector austerity, 
especially in related areas such as youth work. On the other hand, local economic 
conditions were not static and largely improved over the period. A benefit of the Talent 
Match approach was that a high degree of flexibility (through ‘test and learn’) was 
designed into the programme to cope with this change, as discussed in Chapter Six.  
Another implication of the longer contracts was that there was little scope for turnover 
amongst the direct contractors or new market entrants. One Work Programme provider, 
Newcastle College, did exit the market as its contract was taken away by the DWP 
due to a low outcomes rate, but there was otherwise no change to the line-up prime 
providers once appointed Some providers were bought out by other organisations 
during delivery, however, and there was greater change at the subcontractor level. 
Similarly, no Talent Match partnership leads had their funding removed, although one 
partnership returned part of its funding following the two-year review point, in part due 
to other sources of youth unemployment provision becoming available in the same 
area. 
4.3. Commissioning process 
The Work Programme’s contracts were put out to tender through a public 
commissioning process that appeared to be dominated by an emphasis on price (NAO, 
2012). In order to bid for prime contracts, organisations had to first meet several 
f inancial criteria to demonstrate they had the financial capacity to deliver such a large 
programme under a payment by results finance model. Primes were also able to offer 
‘discounts’ on the published payment rate per job outcome, the size of which appeared 
to make all the difference to winning contracts (Simmonds, 2011).  
Commissioning for Talent Match provides a marked contrast, although there is 
comparatively little published on the process. The Fund specified in its 2012 strategy 
that one of its five large strategic investments would be aimed at tackling youth 
unemployment. The 2010 Coalition Government had recently set up Local Enterprise 
Partnerships (LEPs) across England, each combining several local authorities and 
with a remit to set local economic priorities and drive growth, jobs, infrastructure and 
skills. The Fund subsequently chose 21 of these LEP areas, across England, each 
with high numbers of young people unemployed for over a year, through which to 
deliver Talent Match.  
Local authorities in those areas were invited to help the Fund identify a suitable 
voluntary organisation to act as the lead delivery partner. Once appointed, partnership 
leads were then required to submit a bid to the Fund, outlining their approach to 
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partnership and delivery. In most cases this involved establishing a wider delivery 
partnership, either from scratch or based on an existing network within the area. 
Following feedback from this initial bid, there was a substantial, yearlong development 
phase, in which partnerships were able to work up their business case before a final 
allocation of funds.  
The commissioning process for Talent Match was therefore quite lengthy, running from 
October 2012 to the end of 2013. This provided some challenges, such as staff 
turnover and relatively high start-up costs. It stands in marked contrast to the Work 
Programme, which was designed and implemented in record time and in fact received 
some criticism over the lack of time available to prepare bids (NAO, 2012). The overall 
process for Talent Match appears to have been much more discursive and deliberative 
compared to the rigid bidding requirements of the Work Programme. On the one hand 
this allows greater flexibility and sensitivity to local requirements, as well as greater 
potential to work through any problems or issues. On the other, it comes at a potential  
cost in terms of transparency and the speed of the commissioning process.  
4.4. Geographical coverage 
The 18 Work Programme CPAs were based at the regional level across England, 
Wales and Scotland. As a national, universal programme, primes needed to cover 
wide areas inclusively, both rural and urban. A common subcontracting arrangement 
was to divide these large areas into smaller subregions, divided up amongst 
subcontractors (Rees et al. 2013).  
Talent Match, conversely, was a much more geographically targeted programme. As 
described above, the 21 LEP were chosen largely based on having high numbers of 
18-24-year olds out of work. Reflecting the underlying LEP areas, some of the 
partnership areas were much wider geographically than others. Seven partnerships 
covered just one or two local authority districts, six covered three or four districts, and 
eight covered five or more.  
The claimant rate for each LEP is a reasonably strong predictor of whether it was 
featured in the programme2, but it should be noted that if selection were based purely 
on this measure, three of the included LEPs would have been replaced, predominantly 
by more rural areas.  
Indeed, the final coverage of the programme shows a slight prevalence of urban over 
rural areas. Of the 21 partnership areas, 11 were classified by the evaluation team as 
predominantly urban, just one predominantly rural, and nine were a mixture of urban 
and rural areas. Furthermore, 92% of Talent Match participants lived in an address 
classified as ‘Urban’ by the Office of National Statistics (ONS), including both cities 
and small towns. By comparison, however, the ONS (2019) estimate that 
approximately 87% of 15-29-year olds in England live in urban areas, so arguably this 
urban focus is not too unrepresentative of the national picture.  
In addition to the selection of the 21 LEP areas, however, Talent Match also in itially 
placed an emphasis on geographic targeting within partnership areas. Specific wards 
were identif ied with ‘hotspots’ of youth unemployment and high levels of NEETs. It was 
originally envisioned that young people would be recruited only from within these areas. 
In practice, the level of spatial targeting varied amongst partnerships and this original 
focus weakened over the course of the Programme. The evaluation team identified 
four main geographic approaches. Ten partnerships proceeded with the idea of 
targeting specific wards, and one went further by identifying specific estates. In two 
 
2 A correlation of .63 
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partnerships, a mixture of both specific wards and entire local authority districts were 
targeted. In the remaining eight, a geographically targeted approach was not taken, 
though in some cases there were recruitment ‘hubs’ at particular locations.  
In line with the test and learn approach of Talent Match, the commitments to 
geographical targeting evolved. Arguably, youth unemployment was not as tightly 
focussed geographically as first assumed. In practice Talent Match partnerships were 
understandably unwilling to turn away young people who would benefit from their 
services, and in some cases meeting their recruitment targets would have been difficult 
if these restrictions were strictly maintained. The contrast with the universal coverage 
of the Work Programme highlights the issues of equity and prioritisation that inevitably 
accompany a more targeted approach. Potentially, resources can be targeted at those 
who need it most, but equally others who could benefit might miss out on support.  
4.5. The lead providers 
In each LEP area, a partnership lead was appointed in each area to be directly 
accountable to the Fund, overseeing the grant management process and coordinating 
delivery partners. In this respect, partnership leads fulfilled a similar role to ‘prime 
providers’ on the Work Programme, albeit in a different context. The partnership leads 
broadly corresponded to four different types of organisation. These included national 
VCS organisations (seven areas - f ive of which were led by the Prince’s Trust), local 
infrastructure organisations (six areas), local specialist VCS organisations (six areas) 
and consortia-based organisations (two areas). All were from the voluntary sector, 
though the different types are likely to differ significantly in terms of their background 
and wider context. Notably, the Prince’s Trust played a unique and substantial role 
within Talent Match, as the only organisation to act as a partnership lead in more than 
one area. In several areas it was able to utilise its existing, nationwide network of 
provision. Overall, it supported 19 per cent of the young people participating in the 
programme. 
Classifying the Work Programme providers, in contrast, is challenging, given that these 
were extremely large organisations, several of whom have since merged, gone into 
administration, or expanded further into the broader public service contracting field.  A 
few of the contracts were won by training providers or recruitment agencies, but a large 
majority of the primes were public sector contracting specialists, with varying degrees 
of specialism in the welfare-to-work field. Only 8% went to new entrants (G4S and JHP 
Group) (Simmonds, 2011). Simmonds noted that 36 per cent of claimants were 
expected to flow through two providers (Ingeus Delloitte and A4e), and over half (53 
per cent) through four (Seetec and Working Links as well). All Work Programme 
Primes had to have an annual income of at least £20 million in order to bid for their 
contracts.  
The most obvious contrast with the Talent Match partnership leads was that 88 per 
cent of the Work Programme contracts were awarded to private sector organisations. 
There was voluble concern within the policy debate at the start of the Work Programme 
that previous voluntary sector providers had been ‘squeezed out’ of direct contracting 
(WPC, 2011). 13 of the 16 partnership leads were charities, and the remaining three 
were varieties of social enterprise. As discussed in Chapter 3, Talent Match therefore 
stands in contrast to the Work Programme as an explicitly Voluntary Sector led 
programme.  
Talent Match lead partnerships were also generally smaller than the Work 
Programme’s £20 million threshold. Again, however, there is huge variation. Both the 
Prince’s Trust and the Shaw Trust had incomes over £20 million in 2014. Two had 
incomes below £20 million but over £10 million, and a further ten had incomes lower 
than £10 million but over £1 million. Only two had incomes less than this. It is worth 
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noting, therefore, that whilst Talent Match lead partners are, on average, smaller than 
their Work Programme counterparts, they are very large by Voluntary Sector standards. 
For context, the National Coalition of Voluntary Organisations identifies 97 per cent of 
all ‘general charities’ as having an income below £1 million, and 82 per cent less than 
£100,000 (NCVO, 2019).  
4.6. Provider competition 
In theory, one of the advantages of outsourced public services such as the Work 
Programme is that competition between providers will stimulate innovation, efficiency 
and greater effectiveness. There are, of course, also risks that cooperation is 
undermined (Considine et al., 2017). As described above, competition in the Work 
Programme occurred, firstly, at the bidding stage via the ‘discounts’ primes could offer 
from the standard payment rates. Post contract award, however, there was also a 
contract mechanism to ensure competition between the two or three primes operating 
within the same area. The DWP could shift market share, in the form of new referrals, 
from the lowest performing prime to the best performing prime. It did this at least three 
times, shifting 5% of referrals in 10 CPAs, with differences of at least 10 percentage 
points in performance (WPC, 2013).  
Talent Match, in contrast, did not feature substantial competition and was set up 
instead with partnership as a guiding design principle. Partnerships did not overlap 
geographically, precluding any direct competition. As well as lead partners and 
delivery partners, partnerships were encouraged to include stakeholders from the 
public and private sector within their wider strategic partnerships and to act 
cooperatively as an important part of their local youth unemployment field. More detail 
on the partnership approach is available in a previous evaluation report (Damm et al., 
2018). 
4.7. Payment model 
The financial model of the Work Programme was largely structured around the 
principle of ‘payment by results’. Compared to previous programmes prime providers 
received very little funding upfront. The amount differed between different ‘payment 
groups’, which differed on the age, referral route, and particularly the benefit type of 
each service user. A £400 ‘attachment fee’ was initially received for those on 
jobseekers’ allowance aged 18-24, but this was phased out as the programme 
progressed (WPC, 2013). This relatively small payment constituted only between ten 
per cent of the funding available for each service user. The remainder was available 
only following an employment outcome. The maximum payment for 18 to 24-year-olds 
on Job Seekers Allowance was £3,810. This includes the attachment £400 fee, a job 
outcome payment of £1,200 and maximum sustainment payments of £2,210.  
The Work Programme was unusual compared to predecessor schemes not only due 
to the degree of emphasis on payment by results, but also on the requirement for 
employment to be sustained to count as a job outcome (Finn, 2011). This aimed to 
address concerns that previous schemes had been placing users into short term and 
unstable jobs. Even an initial job outcome was paid only if employment was sustained 
for 13 or 26 weeks, again depending on the payment group. Most of the available 
payment was only paid in four-weekly instalments if employment continued to be 
sustained, up to a maximum of 24 months.  
Talent Match was set up under an entirely contrasting funding model. The programme 
was allocated £108 million in funding. As with the choice of the 21 partnership areas, 
the division of this funding between the partnership leads was based on multiple 
criteria. An initial, indicative allocation was made based on levels of youth 
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unemployment in each area, but this was subject to amendment depending on the 
business case made by the partnerships. Once the funding level was determined and 
delivery began, however, it remained fixed and was not based on payment by results. 
This means that partnership leads bore substantially less financial risk than their Work 
Programme counterparts and their service’s financial viability was not dependent upon 
the total of their employment outcomes. This should have allowed them greater 
flexibility to experiment and innovate without risking severe financial consequences 
(discussed in Chapter 6).  
The size of the grant allocated to each Talent Match Partnership varied significantly. 
The smallest grant was to Stoke-on-Trent and Staffordshire (£990k) and the largest 
was to the Black Country (£10.3 million). The amount was not based on any single 
formula but appears most closely correlated with the target each partnership was 
initially set for the number of young people the Partnerships worked with over the 
course of the programme3. It appears slightly less correlated with each partnerships’ 
initial employment target, or the 18-24 claimant rate in each area as of June 20144. It 
should be borne in mind that partnerships will also have differed in terms of the delivery 
model outlined in their bid, their proposed targeting strategy, and their local context.  
On Talent Match, a job outcome was defined as either self -employment, working 16 
hours or more per week, or fewer than 16 hours per week if caring responsibilities, 
education or health and disability limited their maximum working hours. A sustained 
job outcome was defined as six or more months of employment, or 12 months of self -
employment. Talent Match’s aim was to improve young people’s pathways into ‘secure, 
meaningful employment or enterprise’. Unlike the Work Programme, this places an 
emphasis on the quality of the employment, though this is not explicitly included in the 
core definition of a technical job outcome. Ensuring job quality was therefore devolved 
to partnerships. Arguably, Talent Match also placed a weaker emphasis on sustained 
employment compared to the Work Programme, which required three to size months 
of employment to qualify as any outcome at all.  
4.8. Performance management 
The DWP set demanding minimum performance targets for Work Programme prime 
providers. These target employment rates were set at ten per cent higher than the 
DWP estimated would have occurred without the Work Programme, higher than had 
ever been achieved by predecessor programmes during economic boom years (WPC, 
2011). For 18-24 year olds, the minimum performance target was set at 5.5 per cent 
for the first year, and at 44 per cent for subsequent years, until the programme case 
load started to wind down (WPC, 2013). The Work and Pensions select Committee 
noted that after the first year, all the prime providers had missed the target and were 
in technical breach of their contracts, although this improved over later years, at least 
for non-disability benefit related groups (Foster et al., 2014).  
Talent Match partnerships were also set individual employment targets. In total these 
amounted to a programme wide target of 8,100 job outcomes, or 28 per cent of the 
target caseload. Partnerships were also set targets based on the number of young 
people engaged, as measured by the number who filled out the initial 'baseline' 
questionnaire. Overall, Talent Match aimed to engage over 29,000 18 to 24-year olds 
over the life of the programme. As discussed, the relationship between the target 
number of beneficiaries, the target employment rate, and the grant size is not 
particularly strong. This suggests that funding and targets were allocated more on a 
 
3 A correlation of .68. Some partnership’s targets were increased over the course of the programme.  
4 Correlations of .54 and .38 respectively 
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qualitative basis in response to the business plan presented, rather than by a set 
funding formula or payment model.  
In terms of contract management and the pressure to meet targets, the experience of 
both primes and partnership leads will differ between organisations and individuals 
(Foster et al., 2014). Nor is it possible to draw a clear dividing line between the more 
formalised performance management approach of the DWP and the more partnership-
based approach practiced by the Fund. The Work Programme evaluation identified 
that project managers tried to avoid an adversarial approach and more punitive 
measures were seen as a last resort. In many cases primes reported an open and 
constructive relationship (Foster et al., 2014). Nevertheless, the DWP did shift market 
share between providers, terminate a prime contract, and subjected worse performing 
primes to a more intensive management regime (Foster et al.,  2014). It was also 
generally perceived that performance management became more intensive as the 
programme developed and external pressure on the programme increased.  
The targets set by Talent Match do not appear to have been as stringent as those set 
by the DWP and the approach to project management was generally collaborative. 
The main mechanism for reducing or terminating funding was a two-year review clause. 
In practice, no partnerships lost their contract, although as mentioned above one 
partnership did return part of its funding following the review. Grants and performance 
were managed on an ongoing basis, but partnerships were not subject to the automatic, 
contractual enforcement measures seen in the Work Programme. The absence of 
payment by results meant there were no other serious financial consequences for 
missing targets. Nevertheless, throughout the programme, the partnerships did appear 
to be actively aware of their target. There is the possibility that fear of enforcement 
influenced behaviour, even without any punitive actions in practice.  
As with all programme design features, there are potential advantages and 
disadvantages to more or less intensive performance management. Unsurprisingly, 
the stronger the enforcement of targets, the greater lengths providers will go to meet 
them (Rees et al., 2014). This can lead to unintended consequences, however, if 
providers seek to game the system to achieve largely hollow outcomes, such as 
placing people into low quality, high turnover jobs. These may technically meet the 
contract criteria but contradict the intended aims and values of the programme. 
Examples within employment services include pushing jobseekers into poor quality or 
unsustainable employment, or rationing provision to those already closest to the labour 
market (WPC, 2015). The extent to which these undesirable outcomes did or did not 
occur during Talent Match is discussed in Chapter 6. Overall, however, a 
comparatively low degree of risk was passed onto partnerships compared to primes, 
and accountability was largely monitored via an engaged grant making processes. 
4.9. Soft outcomes 
The debate on employment services often features calls for ‘soft outcomes’ to be 
measured as well as ‘hard’ job outcomes (WPC, 2011, 2013; Foster et al., 2014). This 
sometimes includes intermediate, ‘non-job’ outcomes that nevertheless mark the 
removal of a significant barrier to employment. Intermediate outcomes include new 
qualif ications, long term training, volunteer placements, improved housing, greater 
confidence or improved mental health (Aiken, 2007). The proposed advantage to 
measuring these factors is that providers are recognised or rewarded for work that 
they put into helping users move closer to the labour market, even if this does not lead 
immediately to a job outcome. The challenge is that these ‘distance travelled’ 
outcomes can be complicated to measure or verify, let alone use as a basis for targets 
or outcome payments. These milestone outcomes do not appear to have been 
systematically measured as part of the Work Programme but have been to some 
extent recorded as part of the evaluation of the Talent Match programme.  
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Talent Match reported on a series of measures known collectively as the ‘scorecard’. 
As well as job outcomes and sustained job outcomes, these measures included the 
numbers of young people volunteering, regularly volunteering, in basic skills training, 
in work experience, in apprenticeships and in formal education. Although only a 
subsection of all possible ‘soft outcomes’, these measures were not only 
systematically recorded but regularly reported to the Talent Match board. On the other 
hand, recruitment and employment outcomes were the only outcomes for which 
targets were set, which arguably implied their primary importance to the Fund. 
Partnerships do not appear to have been as aware of or concerned about these ‘soft’ 
outcome totals, compared to the hard employment outcomes target, but this does not 
necessarily mean that they did not prioritise them during delivery.  
4.10. Resources per participant 
As well as the headline amounts, it is important to consider the amount of funding 
available per programme user for the provision of services. As the Work and Pensions 
Select Committee (WPC) explains (2013), payment by results can make the headline 
payment levels for job outcomes in the Work Programme misleading. The total 
payment available for jobseekers aged 18 to 24 was £3,810, prior to the removal of 
attachment fees in 2014. Not all the participants referred from this group, however, 
would trigger an outcome payment. This means that the funding for those who did 
would have to partly fund the provision for those that didn’t. The funding available per 
person would, therefore, be significantly lower in practice than the payment rate per 
outcome.  
The Learning and Work Institute (formerly Inclusion) have modelled the finances of the 
Work Programme at several points. In the run up to the Work Programme launch, it 
was identif ied that the funding model for the Work Programme was extremely tight 
(Bivand, 2011; Mulheim, 2011), particularly for the groups with the highest potential 
barriers to employment (Simmonds, 2011). A report by Bivand and Melville in 2016 
suggested that the DWP had paid an average of £1,214 for each participant referred 
to the Work Programme (across all payment groups), but that this was likely to change 
by the end of the programme due to ongoing sustainment payments. An earlier report 
on ESA claimants specifically (Riley et al., 2014), whose outcome rate was likely to be 
lower, suggested that payments for these groups could be as low as £690 per user, 
though again this was likely to change as the programme proceeded. As discussed 
further in the following sections, there was a high risk that providers would simply not 
have the resources to deal with issues such as mental or physical health conditions.  
Although the grant size of each Talent Match partnership is reasonably strongly related 
to the number of young people targeted, there remains substantial variation in the 
resources available per participant. By the end of the programme this had varied 
overall from as little as £2,000 per beneficiary to as high as £11,300 (Wilson et al., 
2019). The amount available per participant is not obviously related to any other 
obvious predictors, such as the deprivation of the areas where young people lived, the 
local claimant count, or the employment and engagement targets set for each 
partnership. This suggests it was largely a feature of the activities outlined in 
partnerships business plans. In all cases, however, the amounts available appear to 
signif icantly outstrip the resources available on the Work Programme. The average 
amount per young person on Talent Match, from any partnership, was around £4,000. 
The Work Programme evaluation does not appear to provide any general statistics on 
the size of caseload per personal advisor, but survey responses suggested that they 
were higher than anticipated for mainstream jobseeker payment groups, particularly 
earlier in the programme. It references caseloads for one provider jumping from 60 to 
180 (Lane et al., 2013). Talent Match delivery partners were surveyed for the third time 
in 2018. In this survey they were asked how many beneficiaries, on average, each full-
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time equivalent key worker worked with at a time. Of those who provided a number, 
the mean was 17 and the median 15, though the results went as high as 60 in some 
cases. These are relatively low averages, which may call into question how some 
partners are interpreting a ‘key worker’. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable overall to 
infer that caseloads were lower for Talent Match compared to the Work Programme 
given the different resources available, meaning young people could potentially 
receive more intensive support and advice.  
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 5 5. Programme design at the 
subcontracting level 
This chapter compares the subcontracting arrangements on both the Work 
Programme and Talent Match. Both programmes operated varieties of subcontracting, 
though in Talent Match subcontractors were referred to as ‘delivery partners’ in l ine 
with the overall partnership approach. The chapter firstly explores the extent of 
contracting in both programmes, before examining the subcontractors themselves. 
Further sections then cover the differing models of subcontracting, including the 
payment model for subcontractors and the bidding requirements. Finally, the 
relationship between primes and subcontractors, and partnership leads and delivery 
partners.  
5.1. Extent of subcontracting 
In discussing subcontracting arrangements, it is useful to distinguish between two 
types of provider. ‘End-to-end’ providers, including most Work Programme primes and 
Talent Match partnership leads, take on full responsibility for at least some programme 
users from the attachment stage through to the end of the users’ involvement. Some 
subcontractors, however, operate on a call off basis, providing one-off or specialist 
provision to users. These are called variously ‘specialist’, ‘tier two’ or ‘non -end-to-end’ 
providers. Notably within the Work Programme, these non-end-to-end subcontractors 
received far fewer referrals than expected, largely reflecting the limited resources 
available to providers (Rees et al., 2013; Foster et al., 2014). Subcontracting within 
the Work Programme therefore occurred mainly to end-to-end providers, which is 
where most of the attention in the following sections lies. These providers are arguably 
also the most comparable to most Talent Match ‘delivery partners’.  
Work Programme primes were free to determine the degree to which they relied on 
subcontracting, though all subcontracted to some extent. Three of the primes 
subcontracted all their services, performing only contract management activities 
(Foster et al., 2014). Potentially, this allowed primes to focus purely on contract 
management without any conflict of interest towards their own provision. The 
remainder delivered varying proportions of service delivery themselves, which in 
contrast may have offered a greater understanding of frontline delivery.  
Subcontracting was also a significant feature of Talent Match but occurred within the 
remit of Talent Match’s explicit partnership model. Subcontractors providing service 
delivery were known as ‘delivery partners’, distinct from ‘strategic partners’ who 
contributed instead to governance, programme design, liaison with employers and 
other programmes, and strategic direction. Unlike the Work Programme, two 
partnership leads did not subcontract a substantial number of referrals to delivery  
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partners and instead delivered almost entirely in house5. At the other extreme, as with 
the Work Programme, some partnerships passed all referrals to delivery partners. This 
occurred in some cases even where in-house capacity to provide delivery did exist. 
The Work Programme evaluation stated that the number of end-to-end subcontractors 
near the start of the programme varied between two and 15, with an average of seven. 
It also found that for most of the prime contracts, the prime accounted for over half of 
the service delivery, with between 35 and 50 per cent remaining to be outsourced to 
other end-to-end providers. These subcontractors tended to cover a specific sub-area 
within the CPA (Foster et al., 2014).  
Three Talent Match partnerships used a very wide network of delivery partners (over 
20). This included Greater Manchester who operated a ‘spot purchase’ model, with 41 
different delivery partners recorded by participants during their baseline interview. 
Overall, the median number of delivery partners was five, while the mean was ten. As 
with the Work Programme, geography played an important role in the size of the 
partnerships. Those covering wider areas unsurprisingly had a larger number of 
delivery partners. The key point is that variety prevailed in both programmes, in terms 
of the amount of delivery outsourced and the number of subcontractors.  
5.2. About the subcontractors / delivery partners 
A survey of Work Programme providers in 2014 found that just over half of all 
subcontractors (52 per cent) were small organisations, according to the number of 
their UK employees (50 or fewer). For end-to-end providers only, however, the figure 
was slightly lower at 42 per cent. Overall, despite providers originating in a variety of 
market sectors and some bringing different specialisms, the Work Programme 
appeared to benefit mid-sized and larger generalist providers (Foster et al., 2014; 
Rees et al. 2013). Generalist providers received more referrals and were better placed 
to weather variations in those referrals throughout the programme.  
Comparison with Talent Match delivery partners is made challenging as the size of 
delivery partners was recorded using income, rather than employees as for the Work 
Programme subcontractors. Around half of delivery partners in 2014 (49 per cent) had  
an income over £1 million (41 per cent in 2015, 44 per cent in 2018). This suggests a 
relatively high average income compared to charities generally, though there was 
considerable variation in both directions. Delivery partners are generally quite local in 
the scope of their operations, however, with 25 per cent operating within particular 
neighbourhoods or communities in 2014 (27 per cent in 2015, 32 per cent in 2018), 37 
per cent at a maximum of LEP or local authority level (31 per cent in 2015 and 2018), 
and the remainder operating regionally or more widely. In general terms, the picture 
for subcontractors in both programmes appears to be heterogeneity, with variation in 
size and background.  
Perhaps the clearest point of distinction between both programmes lies in the sector 
of the organisations involved. There was significant concern around the initiation of the 
Work Programme that the voluntary sector was being ‘squeezed out’ of publicly funded 
employment services, despite a long history of involvement (WPC, 2011). Although 
this was largely the case at the prime level, subcontractor provision did contain a 
substantial number of voluntary sector organisations (40 per cent), only slightly fewer 
than the private sector (46 per cent) and more than the public sector (14 per cent) 
 
5 Based on analysis of CDF data. Only delivery partners with 10 or more referrals over the entire programme were 
included. 
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(Foster et al., 2014). This applies to all subcontractors, although the breakdown for 
end-to-end provision only is similar (Rees et al., 2013). 
In Talent Match, in contrast, a large majority of delivery partners in 2014 were from the 
voluntary sector (74 per cent, 80 per cent in 2015 and 2018). 17 per cent of delivery 
partners were from the private sector (12 per cent in 2015, 11 per cent in 2018), while 
nine per cent were public sector organisations (eight per cent in 2015, nine per cent in 
2018). 22 per cent of delivery partners also had a background at in youth work (18 per 
cent in 2015, 19 per cent in 2018) as one of their two main areas of expertise and 23 
per cent identif ied community development (27 per cent in 2015, 24 per cent  in 2018). 
Whilst the Work Programme evaluation does not provide comparable data, at least a 
proportion of Talent Match providers therefore seem to have backgrounds quite 
distinct from the mould of generalised employment service providers. They arguably 
represent the types of specialised organisations which were squeezed out of direct 
Work Programme delivery, or ultimately received few or no referrals as non-end-to-
end providers.  
5.3. Model of subcontracting 
As well as the extent to which they wished to subcontract, primes had discretion over 
whether to introduce competition amongst their subcontractors or work more 
collaboratively in partnership (Foster et al., 2014). According to the Work Programme 
evaluation (2014), primes generally used both collaborative and competitive tools to 
drive subcontractor performance, generally with a larger emphasis on either one set 
or the other. Competitive measures included league tables, shifting referral shares 
between subcontractors and eventually removing contracts. The evaluation also notes, 
however, that Primes did not reallocate their own market share in this manner, 
regardless of performance (Foster et al., 2014). In many cases, however, supply 
chains were not set up to overlap geographically, which limited the potential for 
competition. Collaborative approaches, in contrast, included sharing best practice or 
labour market intelligence between providers and joint training events.  
In contrast, as discussed, Talent Match was set up to operate as part of a more 
explicitly partnership-based model. Partnerships formed governing boards, 
incorporating representative young people and other stakeholders, though delivery 
partners were generally not included in order to ensure the board remained impartial. 
Nevertheless, there tended to be reasonable levels of agreement between the delivery 
partners over the delivery approach (Table 5.1 and Table 5.2). Over 61 per cent agreed 
that there was cross-partnership agreement on the delivery approach within their 
partnership (57 per cent in 2015, 70 per cent in 2018). These results also seem to 
have improved over the course of the programme as partnerships bedded down into 
delivery. A majority also agreed that this agreement had assisted the delivery of their 
Talent Match partnership (52 per cent in 2014, 51 per cent in 2015 and 63 per cent in 
2018). More detail on the partnership approach adopted by Talent Match is available 
in a previous evaluation report (Damm et al., 2018).  
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Table 5.1: Extent to which there was Cross-Partnership agreement on delivery 
approach 
  2014 2015 2018 
Strongly 
agree 
15% 22% 34% 
Agree 46% 35% 37% 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
21% 24% 22% 
Disagree 9% 10% 4% 
Strongly 
Disagree 
3% 5% 2% 
Don't 
know 
3% 2% 0% 
Not 
applicable 
3% 3% 2% 
Base 106 (2014), 115 (2015), 101 (2018) 
Table 5.2: Extent to which Cross-Partnership agreement on delivery approach 
assisted or constrained development and delivery 
 
2014 2015 2018 
Greatly 
assisted 
delivery 
13% 13% 25% 
Assisted 
delivery 
39% 38% 37% 
Neutral 26% 28% 26% 
Constrained 
delivery 
8% 10% 6% 
Seriously 
constrained 
delivery 
3% 4% 1% 
Don't know 4% 6% 1% 
Not 
applicable 
7% 2% 3% 
Base 102 (2014), 114 (2015), 99 (2018) 
5.4. Subcontractor payment 
Work Programme primes also had discretion over how they paid their subcontractors 
and the extent to which they fully passed on the payment by results model. The 2014 
survey of subcontractors reported on in the Work Programme evaluation indicated a 
wide variety of practices (Foster et al., 2014). 47 per cent of subcontractors were paid 
by results (sometimes including the attachment fee) and 26 per cent were paid via a 
flat rate service fee. 11 per cent were paid by some combination of the two models 
and 14 per cent were paid by an unspecified ‘other’ model (one per cent did not know). 
Much of the difference may reflect the difference between end-to-end and non-end-to-
end provision. In some cases the ‘other’ mechanism may also have indicated a 
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softening of the payment model for some subcontractors, in order to keep their 
f inancial model viable (Foster et al., 2014). It should be noted that regardless of the 
payment method, primes are likely to retain some funding as a ‘management fee’ to 
pay for performance management and other related subcontracting activities. While 
Talent Match partnership leads might not use similar terminology, they too are likely 
to have retained some funding in order to manage the overall partnership.  
Payments between the lead partnership and delivery partners also varied in Talent 
Match. Payment was mostly on a grant basis, but there were also cases of payment 
by results or spot purchase. This tended to reflect the lead organisation's expertise 
with different contracting models and the wishes of the partnership board or committee. 
50 per cent of Talent Match delivery partners in 2014 were paid a fixed amount (51 
per cent in 20156), a model rarely if ever seen within the Work Programme. Seven per 
cent were paid by their caseload (also seven per cent in 2015). 27 per cent were paid 
using payment by results (26 per cent in 2015), which may largely reflect the approach 
of the Leeds partnership, one of the larger partnerships and with experience of 
operating payment by results systems in other programmes. 16 per cent reported 
‘other’ as their payment method (also 16 per cent in 2015), including a combination of 
the previous methods. Again, variety predominates, though with a much lower 
emphasis on outcomes-based payments in Talent Match, as would be expected. In 
fact, the existence of any payment by results at all within Talent Match is arguably a 
surprising feature, which may indicate the way in which the public sector is able to set 
standardised ‘norms’ of behaviour in the wider field, beyond its own programmes.  
5.5. Relationships 
As the Work Programme evaluation points out (Foster et al., 2014) it can be difficult to 
generalise about subcontracting relationships. The relationship may depend on a host 
of factors, including the individuals involved at any given time and how successfully 
the subcontract is proceeding. At the extreme end, under previous programmes, there 
have been complaints of malpractice from primes towards subcontractors, such as late 
payment or subcontractors being frozen out (WPC, 2010; 2009). Primes also, in some 
cases, removed poorly performing subcontractors, either by mutual consent or more 
rarely by terminating contracts (Foster et al., 2014). Prior to this point, primes might 
apply a period of performance management activity, including potentially a reduction 
in referrals.  
Primes ability to control referrals appears to be one of the most important powers 
available to primes, and a notable point of concern amongst subcontractors (Foster et 
al., 2014). Subcontractors run the risk of receiving low numbers of referrals if primes 
keep those users ‘in-house’, or only users least likely to find work and trigger an 
outcome payment (Hudsen et al., 2010; WPC, 2010). Both would translate into lower 
outcome payments under the payment by results model. A decline in the overall 
number of referrals for the Work Programme, reflecting an improving labour market, 
may have exacerbated these issues.  
Data on Talent Match partnerships do not reveal whether any delivery partners were 
subject to performance management activity, including having their contract removed 
or referrals reduced. However, given that many were paid using a fixed grant, and 
many were responsible for the outreach and recruitment of young people themselves, 
the issue of referrals was unlikely to be as much of a live area of concern as in the 
Work Programme. 
 
6 2018 figures are non-comparable, as an extra category ‘by activity/services delivered’ was added  
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Overall, relations between primes and subcontractors varied, sometimes depending 
on the performance of the subcontract. By 2014, 40 per cent of subcontractors felt 
their monitoring and management by their prime was effective, with 22 per cent feeling 
it was ineffective. 70 per cent felt that their relationship with their prime was positive 
overall, with the remainder neutral or negative. Some criticisms included suggestions 
that their performance management was excessive and onerous. More serious 
disputes over outcome payments were also alluded to, though it is noted that no formal 
complaints were recorded as part of the ‘Merlin Standard’ arbitration process.  
Relationships between Talent Match partnership leads and delivery partners also 
appears to have been predominantly positive. Interviews with delivery partners 
acknowledged the key role that the lead partner played and were generally supportive, 
whilst accepting that working in partnership inevitably brings challenges relating to 
communication and cross-organisational management. The responses to the 
partnership delivery survey in 2018 were also generally positive, even more so than in 
earlier waves. The results all indicate disagreement or dissatisfaction in only a small 
minority of cases: 
• 77 per cent of delivery partners agreed that they had support from their lead 
partnership (67 per cent in 2015, 65 per cent in 2014), with six per cent 
disagreeing (eight per cent in 2015, six per cent in 2014) and 17 per cent 
responding that they were neutral or did not know (22 per cent in 2015, 25 per 
cent in 2014).  
• 89 per cent of respondents agreed there were good delivery arrangements within 
their partnership (up from 73 per cent in 2015, 70 per cent in 2014), with only five 
per cent disagreeing (nine per cent in 2015, 12 per cent in 2014). Six per cent 
were neutral or did not know (17 per cent in 2015, 15 per cent in 2014).  
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 6 6. Service design 
This chapter explores the actual delivery and service design on the Work Programme 
and Talent Match. It starts by considering the level of flexibility that providers on both 
programmes were afforded to design their own services. The recruitment of 
participants onto both programmes is then explored, though clearly this has a different 
meaning on the compulsory Work Programme compared to the voluntary Talent Match 
programme. The characteristics of those who did go on to participate in the programme 
are then considered, including the barriers to work and any disadvantages they 
reported. The actual services offered to these individuals are then explored, including 
any in-work support and employer engagement. The extent to which providers were 
able to utilise their f lexibility on both programmes to innovate or develop their services 
as the programme progressed is also considered. Finally, there is a discussion of the 
extent to which resources may have been targeted at those closer to, or further from, 
the labour market. 
6.1. Central specification levels 
The Work Programme applied a ‘black box’ strategy towards providers’ services. 
Under this model, primes were in theory granted flexibility over their delivery model 
and judged instead purely on their results. Unlike previous programmes, no mandatory, 
minimum service standards were specified by the DWP. This flexibility was meant to 
enable individualised services for a wide variety of benefit claimants, reduce 
monitoring costs, and to allow innovation (Foster et al., 2014; Struyven and Seurs, 
2005). However, in their bids, primes were obliged to set out their own minimum 
service standards, which were then embedded into their contracts. Examples included 
participant engagement timescales, levels of contact, and ensuring all participants had 
an action plan and a CV.  
Several sources argued that these specifications were vague and unenforceable (Finn, 
2011; WPC, 2015). The official evaluation did find some evidence of primes failing to 
meet these commitments or stretching their interpretation. However, it also found 
evidence of primes being held to their commitments (Foster et al., 2014). The DWP 
did not allow major changes to Prime’s minimum standards, and in general they appear 
to have been taken seriously as a contractual requirement, equal in status to the 
minimum performance targets.  Some primes and subcontractors felt that these 
commitments had severely limited the ‘black box’ approach and their ability to innovate 
(Lane et al., 2013). They argued that in some circumstances the standards had proved 
inappropriate in practice, potentially leading to less relevant provision or demoralising 
participants (Foster et al., 2014). Others complained of the high level of bureaucracy 
created by reporting and monitoring on minimum provision.  
Despite the centrality of the black box to the design of the Work Programme, however, 
it is notable that Talent Match arguably embodies its principles to an even greater 
degree. Although partnership leads outlined their proposed activities in their  
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business cases to the Fund, there were no formal minimum delivery standards. This 
partly reflects the voluntary nature of the programme, which meant that the degree of 
participation was dependent upon the wishes of the young people involved. Talent 
Match also aimed to implement a test and learn approach, meaning the Fund was 
open to partnerships reworking their delivery models over the course of the 
programme.  
At the subcontractor level, Work Programme subcontractors appear to have generally 
been afforded the same level of flexibility as primes. The clear exceptions were in 
cases where subcontractors were deemed to be underperforming. In the same way 
that some primes complained of creeping intervention by the DWP over the course of 
the programme, some subcontractors suggested that primes’ willingness to intervene 
was gradually increasing (Foster et al., 2014). The evaluation claims that around 50 
per cent of subcontractors reported they had flexibility in their services and 40 per cent 
that they had little or no flexibility, though this latter group may have included more 
‘non-end-to-end’ provision, based around a particular service.  
Prescription by the Talent Match partnership leads, similarly, does not appear to have 
been common practice. They appear to have largely allowed their delivery partners to 
operate autonomously. In the 2018 survey almost all delivery partners (98 per cent) 
indicated that they have at least some independence from the lead partner over how 
they chose to deliver their services (2018 question only). This included 29 per cent 
with total independence. Overall, therefore, both partnership leads and delivery 
partners appear to have had a large degree of autonomy and an ability to devise their 
own activities and interventions.   
6.2. Engaging participants 
The first stage in a participant’s ‘journey’ on either programme is their official referral 
or attachment to a provider. As the Work Programme was compulsory for most 
participants, this process was clearly very different compared to Talent Match. 
Eligibility for the Work Programme depended on users receiving certain benefits, 
particularly ‘Job Seekers Allowance’ and ‘Employment and Support Allowance’. 18 -
24-year olds on Job Seekers Allowance were referred from the Job Centre Plus 9 
months after their initial benefits claim if they remained unemployed, or after three 
months if NEET (not in employment, education or training)  (DWP, 2017). ESA 
claimants were generally referred as soon as allocated into the ‘Work Related Activity 
Group’ by their ‘Work Capability Assessment’. An initial appointment would generally 
be either face-to-face or by telephone (Foster et al., 2014).  
Talent Match participants, in contrast, did not have to be in receipt of benefits. In fact, 
the initial focus of the programme was concerned with young people not on benefits 
and therefore ‘hidden’ from mainstream employment support. Along with the early 
focus on NEET ‘hotspots’, this was partly to ensure that Talent Match provision 
avoided replicating existing Work Programme provision. Participation was also 
originally limited to those unemployed for 12 months or more and not in any form of 
training (Big Lottery Fund, 2012). In practice, all these restrictions were interpreted 
flexibly and relaxed further as the programme progressed. Over the course of the 
programme, 49 per cent of Talent Match participants reported at baseline that they 
received Job Seekers Allowance and 16 per cent reported receiving Employment and 
Support Allowance. Potentially, entry requirements were relaxed part ly due to the 
improving jobs market, which reduced the pool of potential participants as the 
programme progressed. As with the reduced focus on geographical targeting, some 
partnerships appear to have maintained tighter restrictions on participation than o thers. 
There remains a balance between flexibility and clarity, and interactions with the 
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evaluation team suggested that there was some confusion amongst providers on what 
was, and was not, permitted.  
In contrast to Work Programme providers, who had little ability to influence referral 
numbers, Talent Match partnerships were all engaged in varying degrees of outreach 
activity to recruit young people. Across all three waves of the delivery partner survey 
(2014, 2015 and 2018), providers were asked what proportion of their participants 
came from various referral sources. The mean responses are shown in Table 6.1. The 
most common route, on average accounting for over a third of referrals at all waves, 
was ‘referrals from other organisations’. This was closely followed by ‘outreach by your 
organisation’, again accounting on average for around a third of all referrals. Other 
common routes were via ‘existing / previous clients’ and ‘peer contacts’.  
Table 6.1: Sources of referrals – average percentage estimated by providers 
 
2014 2015 2018 
Referrals from other organisations (%) 39 42 36 
Outreach by your organisation (%) 32 32 33 
Existing/previous clients (%) 13 16 15 
Peer contacts (%) 12 9 12 
Drop-in open access facility (%) 7 9 9 
Events (%) 7 6 7 
Marketing and advertising (%) 6 9 9 
Other (%) 7 3 14 
Base 83 (2014), 94 (2015), 104 (2018) 
Partnerships were also asked about their main referral route using an open text 
question. The results largely reflected those in Table 6.1, specifying organisations or 
peer-to-peer approaches. Notably, the Job Centre or Work Programme provided one 
common referral route. It is not clear whether these organisations ever mandated 
young people to participate in Talent Match or if their participation counted towards 
their ‘mandatory job search activity’, which might have impinged upon the voluntary 
nature of Talent Match.  
Overall, delivery partners appear to have been satisfied with their recruitment 
strategies. Delivery partners were asked if they agreed that they had the ability to reach 
their Talent Match target groups. 85 per cent agreed or strongly agreed in the 2014 
survey, rising slightly to 86 per cent in 2015 and 92 per cent in 2018. Because Talent 
Match partnerships had more control over who they recruited onto the programme, 
there was also the potential to target sub-groups of young people. Just less than half 
of partnerships (46 per cent) were doing so in 2015 (question not asked in 2014), but 
this seems to have dropped notably by 2018 (28 per cent).  
6.3. Participant characteristics 
The differences in entry onto both programmes are likely to have resulted in some 
differences in the aggregated characteristics of the programme users. Comparisons 
between the participants of Talent Match and similarly aged participants on the Work 
Programme are challenging, however, due to a lack of comparable data. The official 
f igures for 18-24-year olds attached to the Work Programme provide demographic 
data only on gender, disability and ethnicity. A wider variety of results are available via 
the Work Programme participant survey (Meager et al., 2014), but these refer to all 
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participants, not just those aged 18-24. Nevertheless, it is possible to derive the 
following comparisons: 
• Around two thirds (62 per cent) of young people participating in Talent Match are 
male, which is comparable to the Work Programme (66 per cent)  
• 22 per cent of Talent Match participants identify as part of an ethnic-minority (all 
categories except for ’White British’ and ‘White Irish’). The comparable figure for 
the 18-24-year olds on the Work Programme is slightly lower at 15 per cent.  
• 23 per cent of Talent Match participants have a physical or mental health condition 
expected to last over 12 months. The official f igures for 18-24 year olds on the 
Work Programme only specifies that 20 per cent have a disability (the definition 
of which is unclear). The figure for the participant survey (Meager et al., 2014), 
however, uses a similar definition to Talent Match. Albeit for all ages, this provides 
a comparable figure of 22 per cent.  
• Using the Work Programme participant survey (for users of ages of participants), 
59 per cent of participants lived in the most deprived quartile of areas nationally. 
This compares to 66 per cent of Talent Match participants.  
These basic characteristics suggest that participants on the Work Programme and 
Talent Match are not too dissimilar in demographic terms. Both appear to have worked 
with a broad cross-section of young unemployed people. Although both worked with 
disabled participants, neither was a specific disability focussed scheme or aimed to 
work with the most severely disabled individuals. A slightly higher proportion of Talent 
Match participants were from ethnic minorities, particularly in the London partnership.  
6.4. Barriers to work 
Demographic measures on their own, however, are unlikely to tell us how far from the 
labour market young people are when starting on a programme, or their personal 
barriers to finding work. The Talent Match evaluation recorded a relatively high amount 
of information on these barriers, such as homelessness, mental health or addiction, 
whereas the Work Programme did not officially measure these in any systematic way 
(WPC, 2015). Again, however, it is possible to draw on the Work Programme 
evaluation’s surveys of providers and participants, but with the major caveat that this 
contains participants of all ages. Participants were asked to identify the main diff iculties 
they faced in finding work. For both the Talent Match and Work Programme data, 
participants were free to identify all the barriers that applied.  
• Notably, the results for Talent Match suggest higher frequencies of barriers and 
negative experiences than those for the Work Programme, as reported by 
participants. While this may reflect genuinely higher levels of need amongst 
Talent Match participants, it should be born in mind that there could also be 
differences in how the questions were asked in the Work Programme survey that 
are not immediately apparent from the evaluation report.  
• The most common barrier identif ied by Talent Match participants was a ‘lack of 
prior work experience’ (52 per cent). A much smaller percentage of Work 
Programme participants identif ied this as an issue (15 per cent), though this may 
be partly related to their higher average age.  
• Another common barrier for Talent Match participants was a ‘lack of job 
opportunities locally’ (49 per cent), compared to 21 per cent of Work Programme 
participants who reported ‘lack of jobs in local area’ as a key barrier. Potentially, 
this difference could relate to the geographically targeted focus of Talent Match 
compared to the more universal Work Programme.  
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• One of the starkest differences was that only two per cent of Work Programme 
survey participants identified ‘lack of confidence’ as an issue, compared to 47 per 
cent of Talent Match participants. This matches markedly low levels of wellbeing 
identif ied amongst Talent Match participants (Wilson et al., 2019).  
• A similarly big gap was found for those reporting a ‘lack of interview skills’ (two 
per cent for the Work Programme and 37 per cent for Talent Match. 
• On the other hand, similar levels of Work Programme respondents reported 
‘Family or caring commitments (childcare)’ (f ive per cent) to ‘other responsibilities 
(e.g. caring)’ for Talent Match participants (also five per cent).  
• Ill-health and disability was rated as an issue for 13 per cent of Work Programme 
respondents and for 24 per cent of Talent Match respondents. This is somewhat 
surprising, given the similar rates of disability overall identif ied above.  
• Finally, 11 per cent of Work Programme respondents reported a barrier relat ing 
to ‘not having right skills or qualif ications for jobs interested in’. Talent Match 
participants reported 44 per cent for ‘lack of job specific skills’ and 49 per cent for 
‘lack of qualif ications’. 
Less comparable, but still worth noting, three per cent of Talent Match participants 
responded positively to ‘I have experienced alcohol dependency’ and seven per cent 
to ‘I have experienced drug dependency’. Only half a per cent of Work Programme 
respondents identified ‘drug or alcohol’ problems as a barrier  to employment. Similarly, 
12 per cent of Talent Match respondents had a criminal record of some kind, but only 
two per cent of Work Programme participants identif ied ‘criminal record’ as a barrier.  
In both cases, these measures are slightly different, but they do help to highlight the 
significant adverse experiences reported by many Talent Match participants.  
6.5. Services offered 
As established above, providers on both programmes had a reasonable degree of 
autonomy to determine their own services and delivery model. However, Talent Match 
providers had a higher level of resources per participant and were less restricted by 
service standards set at the bidding stage. Talent Match was also voluntary sector led, 
and as Aiken (2007) outlines, voluntary sector organisations have a long history in 
approaches that develop human and social capital by investing in individual training 
and subsidised employment opportunities. Given all these factors, we might speculate 
that compared to the Work Programme, Talent Match would feature more intensive 
and developmental interventions rather than the ‘Work First’ interventions outlined in 
Chapter 3.  Unfortunately, many of the categories and measures used in both the Work 
Programme and Talent Match evaluations to identify types of services do not overlap. 
This clearly makes comparison diff icult. Furthermore, for both evaluations, different 
sets of categories were used when asking providers what services they delivered, 
compared to asking participants what services they received.  
In the few areas where comparison is possible, the differences involved are modest. 
For example, 63 per cent of Talent Match delivery partners in 2014 reported offering 
help with ‘job search’ (66 per cent in 2015, 80 per cent in 2018) similar to 67 per cent  
of end-to-end Work Programme providers. 63 per cent of Talent Match providers in 
2014 also offered support with ‘soft skills (or life skills e.g. confidence building)’ (80 per 
cent in 2015, 81 per cent in 2018), while 68 per cent of end-to-end Work Programme 
providers offered ‘support in building personal effectiveness / confidence building’. 
Some differences were apparent, however. ‘Temporary work placements’ were widely 
offered on the Work Programme (63 per cent of end-to-end providers), but ‘work 
experience / placements’ were offered by even more providers on Talent Match (81 
per cent in 2014 and 2015, 84 per cent in 2018). Work Programme end-to-end 
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providers were much more likely to offer ‘Advice / support on self -employment or 
business start-up’ (67 per cent) compared to 11 per cent of Talent Match delivery 
partners in 2014 offering ‘pre-enterprise advice and support’ (though this jumped to 48 
per cent in 2015 and 41 per cent in 2018).  
At the individual level, 40 per cent of Talent Match participants reported receiving 
training for ‘basic skills (reading/numbers)’, higher than the 14 per cent who reported 
receiving ‘support or training in maths, reading, writing or English language’ in the 2012 
Work Programme telephone survey (18 per cent in 2014). 47 per cent of Talent Match 
participants reported receiving some form of ‘f inancial support’. In contrast, 36 per cent 
of Work Programme participants reported receiving ‘financial support to help cover the 
costs associated with looking for work (e.g. travel expenses or childcare costs)’ in the 
2012 survey (42 per cent in 2014). 
The higher number of Talent Match providers offering work experience placements is 
matched at the individual level. 43 per cent of Talent Match participants had 
undertaken some form of Work Experience during their time on the programme, while 
33 per cent had undertaken some form of volunteering. In contrast only 15 per cent of 
respondents to the 2012 Work Programme survey reported having undertaken a ‘a 
work experience placement or voluntary work’ during their time on the programme (19 
per cent in 2014). Talent Match participants were also more likely to have ‘taken up 
additional training’ since starting on the programme (48 per cent) compared to Work 
Programme participants who had ‘received a place on a training course’ (17 per cent 
in 2012, 27 per cent in 2014).  
At a minimum, participants on both programmes also appear as though they were able 
to receive a range of ‘work first’ interventions relating to various types of advice and 
support. The most common Work Programme responses were ‘help with writing a CV, 
job applications or interview skills’ (64 per cent in 2012, 75 per cent in 2014), and 
‘drawing up an action plan’ (49 per cent in 2012, 68 per cent in 2014). The most 
common Talent Match responses were ‘one to one support’ (98 per cent), ‘information, 
advice and guidance about careers’ (94 per cent) and ‘advice on personal 
development’ (87 per cent).  
The picture is less clear on the extent to which Talent Match offered an additional tier 
of more intensive and expensive interventions. As outlined above, we know that Talent 
Match participants were more likely to undertake training, including basic skills support, 
work experience, and or volunteering. And while we don’t have comparable Work 
Programme figures, we also know that 17 per cent of Talent Match participants 
received ‘counselling’, 73 per cent received support with ‘practical barriers’ and 27 per 
cent received ‘peer mentoring’. Comparably intensive interventions explored in the 
Work Programme surveys, such as ‘help with housing issues’ (8 per cent in 2012, 7 
per cent in 2014), were rarer.  
Overall, the Work Programme evaluation suggests that the emphasis was largely 
restricted to Work First types of intervention, and that this intensified over the course 
of the programme as training-based interventions were scaled back (Foster et al., 
2014). Talent Match also appears to have delivered work first style interventions as 
the mainstay of its provision but was also more likely to arrange a range of additional, 
more intensive interventions, at least to some degree.   
6.6. In work support 
The Work Programme appears to have offered a high degree of in-work support to 
participants compared to predecessor public employment services. This reflects, in 
part, the emphasis on sustained employment in the payment model. 85 per cent of 
end-to-end Work Programme providers offered in-work support to 90 per cent or over 
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of their participants (Foster et al., 2014). In contrast, 65 per cent of Talent Match 
delivery partners provided in-work support (73 per cent in 2015, 81 per cent in 2018). 
Given that this is likely to include some specialist providers, it is likely that Talent Match 
was also able to offer in-work support to most participants who found work, at least 
towards the end of the programme. Not all individuals offered in-work support choose 
to receive this support, however. Of those who secured an employment outcome at 
some point on Talent Match, only 54 per cent received any in-work support. The 
comparable figure is not available for the Work Programme, but of the take-up rates 
reported by end-to-end survey respondents, the median level was 61-70 per cent. A 
more in-depth discussion of in-work support on Talent Match is provided by Green et 
al. (2017).  
6.7. Employer engagement 
One area where Talent Match activity appears to have been slightly less than the Work 
Programme was engagement with employers. 88 per cent of end-to-end Work 
Programme providers surveyed in 2013 reported contacting employers to ‘iden tify 
vacancies’ (83 per cent in 2014), and only six per cent reported no engagement with 
employers (11 per cent in 2014). The Talent Match delivery partner survey does not 
have completely comparable questions, but only 20 per cent reported conducting ‘job 
brokerage’ in 2014 (46 per cent in 2014, 51 per cent in 2018) and 24 per cent reported 
engaging employers to act as ‘employer mentors’ (28 per cent in 2015, 33 per cent in 
2018).  This still indicates a reasonable degree of engagement, increasing over the 
programme. It is also possible that employers were more likely to engage with Work 
Programme providers who had considerably larger flows of potential applicants to offer 
in return.  
6.8. Service innovation 
The Work Programme evaluation found little evidence of innovation in service design 
and delivery amongst providers (Foster et al., 2014). A range of previous evaluations 
of employment services noted that providers tend to converge on a relatively similar 
model, involving a personal advisor and a personalised action plan (Hills et al., 2001; 
NAO, 2006). As established previously, the Work Programme largely offered a familiar 
set of ‘work first’ interventions, such as help with CVs, job searching and interview 
training (WPC, 2015).  
Rarer examples of innovation included a personal budgets pilot, new approaches to 
in-work support, and co-location within the local Job Centre Plus. Some providers also 
experimented with group provision, though this appears to have been primarily driven 
by a need for cost savings. This lack of innovation may have been partly because of a 
lack of resources. Considine et al. (2018) suggest that innovation and high-quality 
services are both expensive options. Bredgard and Larsen (2008) relatedly suggest 
that providers are instead more concerned with survival within the market than taking 
risks with new methods. The added risk of payment by results may therefore have 
inhibited further risk taking within the Work Programme (WPC, 2015).  
Talent Match, in contrast, was comparatively well resourced and a diversity of 
approaches were encouraged by the Fund at the business development stage. As 
established, most providers delivered a foundation of reasonably similar ‘work first’ 
interventions, as well as some more intensive interventions. More pronounced 
differences between partnerships were also observed, however, with some choosing 
to partially specialise or target their resources on certain issues. For example, the 
Liverpool partnership focussed increasingly on mental health barriers in response to 
the needs their young people were presenting with upon entering onto the programme. 
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Similarly, the Humber partnership pioneered a specialist in-work support service to 
support employers taking on young people with a learning or hidden disability.  
It is also worth noting that the involvement of young people, as discussed in Chapter 
3, constitutes one of the most innovative aspects of Talent Match provision and 
governance. 60 per cent of providers in 2014 reported that young people were involved 
in designing service delivery (64 per cent in 2015). 47 per cent reported young people 
were involved in service delivery itself (50 per cent in 2015) and 44 per cent that young 
people were involved in ‘marketing and advertising’ (50 per cent in 2015). The most 
common form of participation was in ‘engaging other young people / outreach’, 
reported by 77 per cent of providers (76 per cent in 2015). A much more in-depth 
discussion of the involvement of young people is available in a previous publication 
from the Talent Match evaluation (Bashir et al., 2018).  
Table 6.2 Forms of youth involvement in delivery  
  2014 2015 
Engaging other young people/Outreach 77% 76% 
Designing methods of service delivery 60% 64% 
Delivering services 47% 50% 
Marketing and advertising 44% 50% 
Media and dissemination 27% 41% 
Management of service delivery 22% 23% 
Other 16% 10% 
Base 86 (2014), 105 (2015) 
6.9. Test and learn 
As already discussed, some Work Programme providers felt that ability to adapt their 
services as the programme progressed was limited by their commitment to minimum 
service standards in their contracts. Arguably, they also lacked the resources to 
substantially change their operating model beyond achieving cost savings (Foster et 
al., 2014). The Work Programme evaluation noted that the emphasis on Work First 
interventions for most clients increased as attachment fees were phased out, and 
referrals (and therefore outcome payments) proved lower than expected (Lane et al. 
2013). The exception appears to be that some changes were observed in the degree 
of provision on offer for disabled participants’ in receipt of Employment and Support 
Allowance. Having missed initial targets for this payment group, pressure on providers 
to deliver suitable services to this specific group increased. This led to a moderate 
increase in specialist provision and, in some cases, even new specialist 
subcontractors (Foster et al., 2014). It is notable, therefore, the extent to which any re-
design of services appeared to depend largely on the payment model or contractual 
pressure from the DWP. 
In contrast, the Fund explicitly supported a ‘test and learn’ approach. 42 per cent of 
delivery partners responding to the 2018 survey had changed the ways in which they 
delivered activities or services. This admittedly leaves a majority suggesting they made 
no significant changes, though what counts as significant is obviously partially a matter 
of interpretation. It is also worth noting that for almost every type of service queried in 
the delivery partner survey, a greater proportion of providers were offering the service 
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by 2018 compared to 2014. This suggests that overall partnerships were gradually 
increasing the range of their provision over the course of the programme.  
Talent Match providers that did report changes were asked to provide further 
information as part of an open text question. Unsurprisingly, these responses exhibited 
a great deal of diversity, with many changes relating to the internal structure and 
operation of the partnerships rather than their services. This included partnerships 
adding new strategic partners or shifting their approach to geographical targeting. 
There were also a range of responses, however, indicating the addition of new 
activities or services. Examples included group work and new workshops, wellbeing 
and mental health interventions, monetary awards, and a range of different forms of 
youth involvement.  
In contrast to the conclusions from the Work Programme evaluation, therefore, there 
does appear to have been a reasonable degree of change within Talent Match, 
implemented over the course of the programme. 92 per cent reported that the changes 
they had made either improved their delivery a lot (71 per cent) or a little (21 per cent). 
Only two per cent identif ied no difference, and a further two per cent that the changes 
had made delivery worse. Although it is positive that the providers overwhelmingly 
believe the changes improved services, too high a success rate could suggest that 
partnerships remained relatively risk averse in their decision making. It is also possible 
that providers were more willing to share their successes than their failures via the 
evaluation survey. Despite the messaging from the Fund, it is therefore possible there 
remained a tension between meeting engagement and employment targets and 
innovation or development.  
6.10. Creaming and parking 
Programmes such as the Work Programme and Talent Match, which allow the range 
of interventions to be personalised for each individual, require some form of service 
allocation process. The process by which these decisions are made within 
employment services has been consistently controversial (Carter and Whitworth, 2015; 
WPC, 2010). The primary fear is that in pursuit of job outcomes, and where applicable 
outcome payments, providers will focus their efforts only on those closest to the labour 
market. Where there is discretion over who to take onto the programme, this may take 
the form of ‘creaming’: only recruiting only those most likely to find employment. Where 
there is less discretion over recruitment, as for the Work Programme, ‘parking’ is more 
likely. This means providing those individuals less likely to find a job either minimal or 
no provision.  
Commentators identif ied a range of factors which were likely to push Work Programme 
providers towards parking participants. These include the flexibility providers had to 
design their own service provision, resource pressures, contractual pressures, the 
wide range of users on the same programme, the high focus on job outcomes, and 
very low claimant leverage, choice or power (Carter and Whitworth, 2015; Rees et al., 
2014). Previous evaluations have found that an intensification of the payment regime 
or performance targets almost always drives behaviour towards creaming and parking, 
as well as more generalist provision (Stafford et al., 2007; Hudsen et al., 2010). 
The Work Programme payment groups were designed in part to mitigate these risks 
and incentivise providers to work with the harder to help benefit groups. By placing 
Employment Support Allowance claimants, in particular, providers could unlock much 
higher outcome payments. In practice, however, payment groups based on benefit 
type are a very crude measure of distance from the labour market (Carter and 
Whitworth, 2015; WPC, 2015). As a result, variation within groups can far outstrip 
variation between groups. Payment groups were also seen as complex, offering 
insufficient incentive to work with ESA claimants (Foster et al., 2014). In practice, only 
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seven per cent of respondents to the 2014 provider survey suggested that they 
determined levels of provision based on the payment fee (Meager et al., 2014). 
As a result, parking participants does appear to have been commonplace within the 
Work Programme (Rees et al. 2014). 43 per cent of respondents to the 2014 provider 
survey reported that they prioritised those with the best chance of moving into work. 
40 per cent claimed that they prioritised those with the greatest support needs. 15 per 
cent based their allocation decisions on an overall calculation of whether the costs 
were covered by the likely payment. Qualitative interviews with providers further 
reinforced the idea that proximity to the labour market was the driving force for 
targeting resources, followed by an assessment of individual need (Lane et al. 2013; 
Foster et al., 2014).  
One further factor did appear capable of shifting targeting behaviour. Prime’s 
underperformance against their minimum performance levels led to increasing 
pressure over time from the DWP to improve results for ESA benefit recipients, in some 
cases leading to performance management measures (Foster et al., 2014). In some 
cases, this led to an increase in specialist provision, in contrast to the general 
intensification of work first activities. This provision appears to have been funded partly 
due to increased referrals into this group as the programme progressed, but also due 
to cross-subsidisation from the outcome payments of JSA claimants.  
The design of Talent Match, in contrast, does not appear to push providers towards 
creaming and parking to the same extent as the Work Programme. Resources per 
participant were higher, there was less contractual pressure to achieve results and no 
payment by results. Most providers were also voluntary organisations, whose social 
mission may, at least in theory, counter act any pressure to achieve results at the 
expense of equitable provision. On the other hand, unlike Work Programme providers, 
Talent Match providers had the theoretical option of creaming by prioritising individuals 
closer to the labour market in their recruitment. Previous evaluations have also 
suggested that even targets alone, without payment by results, are capable of radically 
shifting provider behaviour as they seek to appear successful (Hills et al. 2001). 
In practice, recruitment by Talent Match providers does not appear to have been 
particularly selective. The 2018 delivery partner survey asked providers to specify the 
two most important factors determining who they worked with (Table 6.3). 48 per cent 
had their referrals process specified in their Talent Match contract, presumably with 
the partnership lead. 38 per cent were referred young people from other organisations. 
35 per cent indicated a process of matching their skills to the young persons need, and 
26 per cent the ‘characteristics of the young person’. 25 per cent suggested they had 
no selection criteria, accepting any young person who approached the organisation.  
As outlined earlier, there is also ample evidence that substantial proportions of Talent 
Match participants had considerable barriers to employment or previous negative life 
experiences. 16 per cent of participants, for example, had previously experienced 
homelessness. 12 per cent had a criminal record, and nine per cent had been in local  
authority care. Seven per cent had experienced drug addiction. Although it is diff icult 
to define the ‘correct’ level of need for programme participants, these barriers seem 
unlikely to be as prevalent in the face of widespread creaming. More detail on ‘targeting’ 
within Talent Match is available in an existing evaluation report (Crisp et al. 2018).  
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Table 6.3: Factors determining which young people partnerships supported 
Factors determining which young people to support 2018 
Specified requirement in your Talent Match contract 48% 
Referrals 38% 
Matching your skills to the needs of the young person 35% 
Characteristics of the young person 26% 
Taking on any young person who approaches the organisation 25% 
Advice of a key worker 10% 
Other 6% 
Base 126 
Determining the most appropriate level of support is inevitably going to involve a 
degree of subjectivity. Arguably, by targeting those closest to the labour market and 
most likely to trigger secure job outcomes, Work Programme providers were operating 
entirely within the aims of their programme: namely to reduce unemployment by as 
much as possible. Focussing too many resources on the hardest to help could be at 
the expense of a larger number of those closer to the labour market, who might derive 
great benefit from support over the final threshold into work. On neither Talent Match 
nor the Work Programme was there an explicit requirement to target resources 
towards those most in need, beyond the minimum set length of unemployment. If 
Talent Match partnerships did so, therefore, it is likely to have been a mission led 
decision rather than due to direct pressure from the Fund.  
There is no straightforward measure of the intensity of support offered on Talent Match, 
which makes it diff icult to determine whether any parking may have occurred following 
engagement. The best available measure is the number of different types of support 
that participants received, though clearly this does not account for the intensity of those 
types of support, and may miss out numerous types not provided as options. 
Nevertheless, there does appear to be a small relationship between the ‘distance to 
the labour market’ measure (see Wilson et al. 2019 for more details) and the number 
of types of support offered. Those in the group ‘f urthest from the labour market’ 
received an average of 6.1 interventions, while those in the ‘nearest to the labour 
market’ group received an average of 5.5.  
Most partnerships (78 per cent) also suggested that they were able to be flexible, at 
least up to a certain amount, in how much support they offered each individual young 
person (Table 6.4). This included 39 per cent who were able to be completely flexible. 
A further 18 per cent suggested that they offered ‘defined levels of support depending 
on the needs of the young person’. Only four per cent suggested that all young people 
received the same support, perhaps reflecting specialist ‘non-end-to-end’ provision.  
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Table 6.4: Determinants of how much support a young person receives 
Determinants Count 
We are able to be completely flexible 39% 
We tailor support to the needs of the young person up to a certain amount 39% 
We offer defined levels of support depending on the needs of the young 
person 
18% 
All young people receive the same support 4% 
Base 126 
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 7 7. Conclusions 
As this report has made clear, the Work Programme and Talent Match provide 
examples of two very different types of employment programme, but also notable 
similarities which aid their comparison. 
The differences between the two programmes are perhaps the more obvious. Clearly, 
the two projects differed significantly in terms of their size and scope. The Work 
Programme was largely compulsory, while Talent Match was voluntary. Payment by 
results was much more predominant in the Work Programme. Talent Match was 
geographically targeted, the Work Programme operated nationwide. Relationships 
were also more hierarchical in the Work Programme, with higher potential for 
performance management. Talent Match participants were able to invest a higher level 
of resources into delivery for each participant. As a result of several these differences, 
incentives to cream or park appear to have been lower in Talent Match. 
Whereas the work programme embodies the principles of the market and public sector 
contracting, notably payment by results, Talent Match arguably adopts a more network, 
partnership-based approach (Osborne 2006). From the bidding stage through to 
delivery, Talent Match utilised partnership as a core part of its ethos. This is borne out 
in several aspects of this report. The bidding process and contract management from 
the Fund was comparatively discursive and based on ongoing grant management 
procedures. Youth involvement also runs through many of the comparisons, acting as 
a key example of innovation reflecting a differing underlying ethos.  
Perhaps less obvious, are the similarities between the two programmes. Both are 
‘supply side’ labour market, targeted individual capabilities and assets, with much 
more limited interventions geared towards creating labour market opportunities via 
activities such as job subsidisation. Neither was a dedicated disability programme. 
Both offered a core of work-first interventions, though Talent Match also offered a 
range of more intensive interventions and the opportunity for youth involvement in 
partnerships. Both were divided into geographical regions, covered by direct 
contractors. Whilst implemented in different ways, therefore, both are examples of the 
‘prime’ model of delivery, as opposed to more dispersed contracting models. Both 
exhibited relatively high levels of flexibility for these direct contractors, which was 
generally passed on to subcontractors and delivery partners. And both targeted 
employment outcomes as a central performance measure to set their core targets.  
The differences between the two, therefore, are not always as clear cut as might be 
first assumed. Partnership working was found by the official evaluation of the Work 
Programme across several supply chains (Foster et al., 2014). While Talent Match, an 
overwhelmingly voluntary programme, partnerships by necessity received referrals in 
some cases from the Job Centre Plus. It is not, therefore, necessarily helpful to 
caricature either programme as the embodiment of either grant based, voluntary sector 
provision or of public sector outsourcing to monolithic private sector contractors. The 
reality is unsurprisingly more nuanced.
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By exploring in-depth, therefore, where the programmes contrasted in their design and 
operation, it is intended that they are both understand more clearly than in isolation. 
Although outcomes and value for money are outside the scope of this report, it is 
clearly necessary to understand the different context and design features of both 
programmes in order to judge their performance on their own terms. It is also possible 
to determine whether each has succeeded in implementing a programme in line with 
its own underlying ethos and principles.  
It is particularly hoped that the comparison helps to highlight the many various design 
decisions which go into the implementation of a major employment programme. 
Various decisions taken in the design of Talent Match which may seem natural or lie 
implicit, are made explicit by having a tangible counter example and vice versa. This 
report therefore highlights that whilst in some ways Talent Match mirrors existing 
provision, in others it was a genuinely innovative and distinctive form of provision for 
young unemployed people.  
Lessons for policy 
Programme design is vitally important to the eventual character of a programme, 
including the behaviour of providers, the individuals who it helps and the services it 
delivers. If certain programme characteristics are desired, such as innovation over the 
course of delivery, targeting the hardest to help, or balancing job outcomes against 
‘softer’ outcomes, then these need to be explicitly reflected in the programme design.  
While Talent Match and the Work Programme were very diff erent programmes, both 
lay on several spectra, including between human capital and work first approaches, 
partnership and performance management, and voluntary sector and private sector 
provision. In most cases, neither programme lies at the extreme point,  and it is 
important not to caricature either as the perfect embodiment of a particular model or 
approach.  
Talent Match could, if desired, have been differentiated even further from the Work 
Programme, whether by setting outcomes for intermediate outcomes, using a larger 
number of smaller contracts, or setting targets for engaging the very hardest to help. 
Talent Match might even have dispensed with an employment target, trusting 
providers to adopt an entirely holistic approach. These would not necessarily have led 
to a ‘better’ programme, but it is important to highlight that these are important design 
decisions for this and any future employment programmes.  
Finally, it should be borne in mind that many of these design features have cost 
implications. Talent Match partnerships were able to spend a much higher average 
amount per participant than the Work Programme and it is this investment, above all 
else, which allowed innovation in its delivery and design. 
 45 
 8 8. References 
AVECO (2015) Youth Unemployment: The crisis we cannot afford. London: ACEVO. 
Bashir, N., Pearson, S., Sanderson, E. and Wells, P. (2018) Talent Match Evaluation: Involving 
Young People. Birmingham: National Lottery Community Fund. 
Big Lottery Fund, (2012) Talent Match Programme Guidance. Birmingham: The National 
Lottery Community Fund. 
Bivand, P. (2011) Can the Work Programme succeed? Working Brief, February. London: 
Centre for Social and Economic Inclusion. 
Bivand, P. and Melville, D. (2016) Work Programme Statistics Learning and Work Institute 
Analysis, March. Leicester: Learning and Work Institute 
Bennett L., Bivand P., Ray K., Vaid L. and Wilson T. (2018) MyGo Evaluation: Final report, 
September. Leicester: Learning and Work Institute. 
Bredgaard, T. and Larsen, F. (2008) Quasi-Markets in Employment Policy: Do They Deliver 
on Promises? Social Policy & Society, 7(3), pp.341–352. 
Carter, E. and Whitworth, A. (2015) ‘Creaming and Parking in Quasi-Marketised Welfare-to-
Work Schemes: Designed out Of or Designed In to the UK Work Programme? Journal of 
Social Policy, 44 (2), pp.277–296. 
Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research (CRESR) (2019) Talent Match Technical 
Report. Sheffield: CRESR. 
Conlan, G., Patrignani, P. and Mantovani, I. (2014) The Death of the Saturday Job: The 
Decline in Learning and Earning Amongst Young People in the UK. UKCES. 
Considine, M., O’Sullivan, S. and Nguyen, P. (2018) The Policymaker’s Dilemma: The Risks 
and Benefits of a ‘Black Box’ Approach to Commissioning Active Labour Market Programmes. 
Social Policy and Administration, 52 (1), pp.229-251. 
Damm, C., Green, A., Pearson, S., Sanderson, E. and Wells, P. (2018) Talent Match 
Evaluation: Youth Employment Partnerships, October. Birmingham: National Lottery 
Community Fund. 
Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) (2017) Chapter 2, Work Programme Provider 
Guidance. London: DWP. 
Ecorys (2017) Youth Employment Initiative Process Evaluation: Assessment of Strategic Fit, 
Design and Implementation, DWP Research Report 945, October. London: DWP.
 46 
Finn, D. (2011) The design of the Work Programme in international context , Report for the 
National Audit Office. London: National Audit Office. 
Foster, S., Metcalf, H., Purvis, A., Lanceley, L., Foster, R., Lane, P., Tufekci, L., Rolfe, H., 
Newton, B., Bertram, C. and Garlick, M. (2014) Work Programme evaluation: Operation of the 
commissioning model, finance and programme delivery, Research Report No 893, December. 
London: DWP. 
Gadsby, B. (2019) Establishing the Employment Gap, April, Research Briefing 1. London: 
Impetus - Private Equity Foundation. 
Greenberg, D., Knight, G., Speckesser, S. and Hevenstone, D. (2011) Improving DWP 
assessment of the relative costs and benefits of employment programmes, Working Paper No 
100. London: DWP. 
Impetus-PEF (2017) Youth Jobs Index, August, London: Impetus - Private Equity Foundation. 
Lane, P., Foster, R., Gardiner, L., Lanceley, L. and Purvis, A. (2013) Work Programme 
Evaluation Procurement, supply chains and implementation of the commissioning model,  
Research Report No 832. London: DWP. 
McQuaid R. (2015) Multiple Scarring Effects of Youth Unemployment, Skills in Focus 11. 
Glasgow: Skills Development Scotland. 
Meager, N., Newton, B., Sainsbury, R., Cordon, A., Irvine, A. (2014) Work Programme 
evaluation: the participant experience report, Research Report No 892. London: DWP. 
Mulheirn, I. (2011) Will the Work Programme Work? Examining the future viability of the Work 
Programme. London: Social Market Foundation. 
National Audit Office (NAO, 2012) The introduction of the Work Programme, HC 1701, 
Session 2010–2012, January. London: National Audit Office. 
National Audit Office (NAO, 2014) The Work Programme, HC 266, Session 2014-15, July. 
London: National Audit Office. 
National Council for Voluntary Organisations (NCVO) (2019) UK Civil Society Almanac 2019, 
[online] available at: https://data.ncvo.org.uk/ 
Newton, B., Meager, N., Bertram, C., Corden, A., George, A., Lalani, M., Metcalf, H., Rolfe, 
H., Sainsbury, R. and Weston, K. (2012) Work Programme evaluation: Findings from the first 
phase of qualitative research on programme delivery, Research Report No 821. 
Office of National Statistics (ONS) (2019) Rural population and migration September 2019, 
[online] available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_da
ta/file/834226/Rural_population_and_migration_September_2019.pdf 
Osborne, S.P. (2006) The New Public Governance? Public Management Review, 8 (3), 
pp.377-387. 
Rees, J., Taylor, R. and Damm, C. (2013) Does sector matter? Understanding the experiences 
of providers in the Work Programme, Working Paper 92. Birmingham, Third Sector Research 
Centre. 
Rees, J., Whitworth, A. and Carter, E. (2014) Support for All in the UK Work Programme? 
Differential Payments, Same Old Problem. Social Policy and Administration, 48 (2), pp. 221–
239. 
 47 
Riley, T., Bivand, P. and Wilson, T. (2014) Making the Work Programme work for ESA 
claimants, April. London: Centre for Economic and Social Inclusion. 
Simmonds, D. (2011) Work Programme results: perform or bust, Working Brief 7, May. London: 
Centre for Social and Economic Inclusion. 
Struyven, L. and Seurs, G. (2005) Design and redesign of a quasi-market for the reintegration 
of jobseekers: empirical evidence from Australia and the Netherlands. Journal of European 
Social Policy, 15 (3), pp.211–229. 
UK Commission for Employment and Skills (UKCES) (2012) The youth employment challenge, 
July. Wath-upon-Dearne and London: UKCES. 
Work and Pensions Select Committee (WPC) (2009) DWP's Commissioning Strategy and the 
Flexible New Deal, HC 59-I. London: The Stationery Office. 
Work and Pensions Committee (WPC) (2010) Management and Administration of Contracted 
Employment Programmes. HC 101. London: The Stationery Office. 
Work and Pensions Committee (WPC) (2011) Work Programme: providers and contracting 
arrangements. HC 718. London: The Stationery Office. 
Work and Pensions Committee (WPC) (2013) Can the Work Programme work for all user 
groups? HC 162. London: The Stationery Office. 
Work and Pensions Committee (WPC) (2017) Employment Opportunities for Young People, 
HC 586, London: The Stationery Office. 
 
 48 
 
A1 
 
Annex 1: Summary table 
Programme design – direct contracts 
 The Work Programme Talent Match 
Programme size Final payments to contractors 
estimated at £2.4 billion (NAO, 
2014) 
£108 million total available 
funding 
Delivery period June 2011 to April 2017 January 2014 to January 2019 
Geographical coverage All of  England, Wales and 
Scotland, divided into regional 
contract package areas 
21 selected LEP areas with high 
areas of  youth unemployment 
Role of the voluntary sector  Predominantly private sector 
contractors 
Voluntary sector led 
partnerships 
Funding model  Primarily ‘payment by results’ 
on the basis of job outcomes 
Grant funding  
Job outcomes Varied according to ‘payment 
group’, based largely on 
benef it type. Counted 
sustained job outcomes only 
Recorded both sustained and 
non-sustained job outcomes, 
usually requiring 16 plus hours 
per week 
Outcome targets Contractual minimum 
performance levels for three 
payment groups 
Overall job outcome target for 
each partnership 
Resource levels Extremely tight and dependent 
upon outcomes 
Fixed and more generous per 
participant than the Work 
Programme, though varied 
significantly between 
partnerships  
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Programme design – subcontracting 
 The Work Programme Talent Match 
Subcontracting approach Varied between heavy 
performance management and 
competition between 
subcontractors, and more 
partnership based models 
Generally partnership based 
between the lead partner and 
‘delivery partners’ 
Role of the voluntary sector 40 per cent voluntary sector 
subcontractors 
74 per cent voluntary sector 
subcontractors 
Payment model Predominantly payment by 
results for ‘end-to-end’ 
subcontractors 
Predominantly fixed payments, 
or payments by caseload or 
activity 
Service design 
 The Work Programme Talent Match 
Flexibility over service 
design 
High f lexibility as part of the 
black box approach, but 
subject to pledges made at the 
contracting stage 
Very high f lexibility as part of a 
test and learn approach 
Participant eligibility Based on time on benefit Initial restrictions relaxed as 
the programme progressed 
Participant characteristics Predominantly male, white and 
non-disabled 
Similar demographics to the 
Work Programme, with 
evidence of severe barriers to 
work for some participants 
Types of services Work f irst interventions, some 
disability specialist services as 
the programme progressed 
Baseline of work first 
interventions, but also 
examples of more intensive 
interventions when needed 
Innovation and development Limited by resources and 
contracted minimum service 
standards 
Some examples of innovation, 
particularly youth involvement 
Targeting Based primarily on cost-benefit 
calculations and likelihood to 
trigger outcome payments 
Either contractually fixed, or 
more f lexible to individual need 
 
